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NONRECOURSE DEBT IN EXCESS OF FAIR MARKET 
VALUE: THE CONFLUENCE OF BASIS, REALIZATION, 
SUBCHAPTER K AND THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY 
DanielS. Goldberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article will explore the issues that arise when the value of property that 
has been financed with nonrecourse debt declines below the amount of the 
nonrecourse.debt. Such property, referred to in this Article as "excess liability. 
property," raises interesting issues involving realization, potential cancellation 
of indebtedness income, and, in the context of Subchapter K, the relationship of 
inside basis to outside basis. Based upon an analysis of these issues, the Article 
takes the position that the excess liability issue should affect the tax treatment of 
the property and its owner at the time of acquisition and disposition of the 
property only. This position has important implications when there has been a · 
significant modification of the nonrecourse liability and impacts on the potential 
for realization of gain or cancellation of indebtedness income at that point. It 
further takes the position that the doctrine of Estate of Franklin 1 should be · 
applied at the partnership level and not the partner level, and should not be 
applied on the acquisition of a partnership interest of a partnership that already 
owns the excess liability property. Under this view, the internal consistency of 
Subchapter K can be maintained, and Subchapter K will remain consistent with · 
general gain realization and basis provisions of the Code and case law interpret-
ing those provisions. These conclusions are at odds with two recent and impor- . 
tant articles dealing with the treatment of nonrecourse debt that has been modi-
fied2 and the excess liability problem in Subchapter K.3 
This Article uses the excess liability situation to explore the interesting issues . 
that arise when statute, logic, and equity intersect, giving lens to an understand- . 
ing of the strengths and limitations of each. In that manner, the exploration is 
instructive in an understanding of some fundamental principles of the income 
tax in general and partnership tax in particular. 
II. THE LANDSCAPE 
Since the time tax shelters became a significant part of the American financial 
culture, investors and tax practitioners have been seeking the eternal fountain of 
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Of Counsel, Tucker, Flyer & Lewis, 
P.C.; A.B. University of Rochester, 1968; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1971. The author wishes to 
thank Professor Robert I. Keller of the University of Maryland Law School for his helpful comments 
with respect to this Article. 
'Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 {9th Cir. 1976), aff'g, 64 T.C. 752 (1975). 
2 Linda Sugin, Nonrecourse Debt Revisited, Restructured and Redefined, 51 TAX L. REv. 115 
{1995) [hereinafter Sugin]. 
'Claire E. Toth, Nonrecourse Debt in Excess of Fair Market Value and Disappearing Basis: The 
Partnership Paradox, 50 TAX LAw. 37 {1996) [hereinafter Toth]. 
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non" inclusion at the end. of the ~helter", and have pondered the complexitit<s and· 
unpleasantness ofliving with a tax generator. The real estate tax shelter, which 
will be the backdmp of. this Article, arises because property can generate deduc-. 
tions from depreciation, even though the. property has not declined in value .. A 
tax shelter becomes ac.cessible to the. risk. averse and those of modest .means 
because part· of the cost of the property and, therefore, its basis can be paid by 
use of nonrecourse indebtedness; for which the purchaser is not .ultimately 
liable. There is·even a silver lining to the storm cloud that forms dut:ing the years 
of shelter, because the ultimate sale of the property for consideration in the form 
of debt assumption or relief will generally yield capital gain, which is taxed in a 
preferential way. These three factors-losses without realization, leverage, and 
conversion of ordinary income to capital gain-are at the heart of all real estate 
tax shelters. The interplay of the three tax shelter factors is sometimes seen as an 
abuse of the requirement in the tax law of realization, pursuant to which no tax 
is imposed on inqeases in value until there has been a sale or other disposition 
of ,the property. The 1986 Tax Reforffi Act enacted a global cure for realization 
. I . , . ' ' 
abuses under .. the passive fiCtivityloss rules. . . 
Before the 1986 Act, many tax' ·shelter transactions were engaged in through 
limited partnerships, because that vehicle allows the pass-through to the partners 
of favorable tax attributes, such as depreciation or losses, for use to ~ffset other 
income o(tho~e partners. Moreover, the limited partnership vehicle insulates th~ 
partn~rs, .at l~as~ the limited partners, from ever having to actually pay out ~f 
pocket any of the partnership's liabilities or expenses. 
Subchapter K. of the Il}temal. Revenue· Code· (die "Code") govems··the' tax 
treatment of partnerships and partners (as well as limited liability companies and 
members) and provides an iptricate' relationship between the two. Partnerships 
are ~onduits; the partners, not the P,artnership, are subject to tax.5 The treatment 
of the partners, however, is dependent upon the activities of the partnership. In 
s~me contexts .• the partnership is treated as an entity similar to a corporation. In 
other contexts, the partnership is treated as an aggregate of all of its partners, 
similar to co-ownership. . 
Notwith~tanding the ~nactment of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which chilled 
the attitudes.of many investors .towards entering into new tax shelters, there _are 
still many transaction.s that occurred before· the Act's effective date or that were 
entered into by taxpayers who were unaffected by the passive loss restrictions. It 
is not uncommon,.therefore, to encounter property whose basis to the owner is 
substantially below the principal amount of nonrecourse indebtedness secured 
by the prope~y. More alarming, however, at least to the investor, is the situation 
(aced by many investors, in which the value of the property is also substantially 
less than the amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness secured by the property. In 
this latt~r 7ase: referry~ to in. this Article as "excess liability property," it is not 
,. 
•see Martin D. Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719 (1975); Toth, supra note 3. 
'I.R.C. § 70 I. 
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infrequent that the operating income from the property is insufficient to pay 
operating expenses and debt service. Indeed, many of these properties generate 
taxable income with insufficient cash flow to service the debt, much less to be 
available for use by the owner. Often, the owner is a partnership. 
To deal with these cash shortfall issues, it is often advantageous to seek to 
modify the nonrecourse indebtedness that is secured by the property. In other 
situations, or even in conjunction with debt modifications, it is often helpful to 
attract new partners into· the partnership or replace existing partners with new 
partners. 
III. NONRECOURSE DEBT IN EXCESS OF BASIS 
A. . The Non-Partnership Situation 
1. In General 
The general income tax issues that arise in excess liability situations, i.e ..• 
when nonrecourse liabilities exceed both the basis and value of property, involve 
several provisions of the Code. The provisions involved upcin acquisition of 
excess liability property are sections 1011 and 1012, relating to adjusted basis 
and basis of property. These sections, in substance, define basis as cost, a term 
that is amplified and clarified by case law. Basis represents the amount that can 
be received upon sale of the property without incurring tax. It also represents the 
amount that can be "recovered" for tax purposes through tax deductions, such as 
depreciation, and other downward adjustments to basis. 
The provision involved upon the disposition of excess liability property is 
section 1001, relating to the determination of amount and recognition of gain or 
loss. Specifically, section '1 00 I (b) defines amount. realized from the sale or other 
disposition of property as the sum of any mciney received plus the fair rriarket 
value of property (other than money) received. Together, the amount realized 
and adjusted basis determine gain or loss to a taxpayer upon the sale of the 
property or other event of realization. ' 
The third fundamental component of determining income (or loss) under the 
tax system is the concept of realization. Disposition of excess liability property 
clearly results in realization. But, it is possible, and it has been suggested, that 
other events could also constitute realization, such as modification Of the debt. 
2. Purchase of Property with Nonrecourse Debt that is Less than the Value 
of the Property 
Frequently, investors purchase real estate by financing the purchase with debt. 
In general, the basis of property includes not only the cash component of the 
purchase price but also the debt component, regardless of whether the source of 
the funds was the seller itself or a third-party financier. Moreover, in general, the 
debt is includable in the cost of the property and, therefore, its basis even if the 
debt is nonrecourse, that is, even if the property that serves as security for the 
debt represents the only asset against which the lender can enforce its claim. 
Under those circumstances, the purchaser of the property is not personally li-
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able, and the purchaser's other assets are· free of claims of the lender. 
Suppose that after the purchase of the property financed with nonrecourse 
debt the value of the property falls below the outstanding nonrecourse indebted-
ness. The decline in the value of the property does not represent an event of 
realization6 any more than would an increase in the value of the property beyond 
its original purchase price. Rather, an event of realization would occur when the 
owner sells the property to. a third party, who assumes or takes the property 
subject to the debt, or who pays proceeds that the owner can use to discharge the 
debt. Further, if the value of the property drops below the balance of the debt 
and the owner of t~e property transfers the property to the lender either in 
foreclosure or in lieu of foreclosure, or the owner of the property transfers the 
property to a third party who takes the property subject to the liability (regard-
less of whether the purchaser personally assumes the liability), the transfer con-
stitutes an event of realization. As a result, the transferor is deemed to realize for 
tax purposes an amount equal to the outstanding balance of the nonrecourse loan 
and any cash or other property received.7 This result obtains even if the value of 
the property is less than the outstanding balance of the nonrecourse indebted-
ness.8 The U.S. Supreme Court reached this conclusion in Commissioner v. Tufts 
and explained the decision by resorting to "tax logic" and the necessity for 
internal consistency in the tax law. In the Court's view, because the nonrecourse 
indebtedness was respected as a genuine indebtedness when the property was 
purchased, thereby being included as a part of the cost of the property, it should 
also be respected as genuine indebtedness when the property is sold. This result 
should occur regardless of the value of the property securing the indebtedness, 
and the debt should be included at its face amount as part of the amount realized 
upon the sale.9 
Boris Bittker explained this result even before the Supreme Court's decision 
by reference to the principle that the gain that is subject to ultimate tax should be 
no more or less than the actual economic gain to the taxpayer from the transac-
tion.10 Econ0mic gain in a transaction that took place over several years would 
be measured by initial cash invested as compared to final cash proceeds plus 
untaxed cash received during the course of the transaction. The net cash re-
ceived, if a positive amount, would represent a measure of the taxpayer's gain 
and, if a neg·ative amount, would represent a measure of the taxpayer's Joss. 
Thus, if there were an excess of untaxed cash received over cash invested during 
the time the property was held, but no additional cash was received upon the 
disposition of the property, then the disposition should result in a taxable gain in 
6 See, e.g., San Antonio Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1989); Reporter 
Pub. Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 743 (lOth Cir. 1953). 
1 See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300,317 (1983). 
8 /d. at 307. 
9 /d. at 309-10. 
10 See Boris l. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277 
(1978). 
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the amount of that excess cash, and the gain would be realized at the time of 
disposition of the property. The gain realization should be equal to the taxpayer's 
economic gain from the overall transaction. This gain realization principle, for 
tax purposes, is necessary in Professor Bittker's view to balance the taxpayer's 
gain for tax purposes with his gain for economic purposes. 11 
Further, in the event that during the course of ownership of the property the 
taxpayer reported losses from depreciation for tax purposes, then the reportable 
gain at the time of the event of realization should not only include the amount of 
the actual economic gain from the overall transaction, but also, include an addi-
tional amount equal to previous losses that were reported. Under Bittker's "bal-
ancing entry" theory, the mechanical computation of amount realized by includ-
ing the nonrecourse debt assumed is necessary, so that the net gain for tax 
purposes, consisting of taxable gain minus taxable losses, would exactly equal 
the taxpayer's economic gainY 
The kind of analysis demonstrated by the Supreme Court in Tufts and by 
Boris Bittker and other commentators13 prior to Tufts reflects the importance of 
the overriding principle in tax law that the amount of economic profit and not 
more should be subject to income tax. This principle has been recognized by the 
Supreme Court virtually since the inception of the Code. 14 When faced with the 
possibility of a taxpayer avoiding tax on economic gain through a technical 
reading of Code provisions, the Supreme Court relied on tax logic to prevent the 
avoidance. 
The regulations now deal specifically with the potential excess liability issue. 
Regulation section l.l001-2(b), entitled "Effect of Fair Market Value of Secu-
rity" provides as follows: 
(b) The fair market value of the security at the time of sale or disposition is not 
relevant for purposes of determining under paragraph (a) of this section the 
amount of liabilities from which the taxpayer is discharged or treated as dis-
charged. Thus, the fact that the fair market value of the property is less than the 
amount of the liabilities it secures does not prevent the full amount of those 
liabilities from being treated as money received from the sale or other disposi-
tion of the property. 15 
This rule is essentially a restatement of the holding in Tufts, although it was 
actually issued while Tufts was being litigated. 
The rules discussed above have been applied by several other courts to deal 
with related types of transactions. The body of law that has developed can be 
11 /d. at 283-84. 
12 /d. at 284. 
13 See James S. Halpern, Liabilities and Cost Basis: Some Fundamental Considerations, 7 J. R.E. 
TAX 334 (1980). 
14 See Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 183 (1918) (reaching this result and viewing the 
principle as inherent in the tax law without benefit of the statutory predecessors of sections 61(a)(3), 
1001, and 1012). 
13 Reg. § 1.100l-2(b). 
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summarized as follows: if property is purchased for cash and nonrecourse in-
debtedness in an amount that is not greater than the value of the purchased 
property, then the nonrecourse indebtedness will be respected as a true liability 
for tax purposes upon the purchase.16 Further, a refinancing that generates an 
additional liability, even if nonrecourse, does not represent an event of realiza-
tion. 17 The full amount of the nonrecourse debt continues to be respected, even if 
the property's value later declines below the outstanding balance of the liabil-
ity.18 The mere reduction in value of the owner's property will not result in tax 
consequences to the owner (or if the owner is a partnership, its constituent 
partners) until there is an event of realization. 19 Upon disposition of the property, 
however, an event of realization occurs, causing the entire amount of the 
nonrecourse liability to be included in the amount realized component of the 
gain computation.20 This result is unaffected by the fair market value of the 
property. 
3. Purchase of Property with Nonrecourse Debt that Exceeds the Value of 
the Property 
Suppose that a taxpayer purchases property for nonrecourse debt in an amount 
that substantially exceeds the value of the property. In that case, there is a 
plethora of authority that would deny the taxpayer inclusion of some or all of the 
liability in its basis in the property.2 ' 
In Estate of Franklin, the taxpayer sought to include, for purposes of basis 
and, therefore, depreciation, the full amount of a nonrecourse promissory note 
issued to the seller as part of the purchase price of the property.22 Finding that 
the amount of the nonrecourse promissory note substantially exceeded the fair 
market value of the property at the time of purchase, the Tax Court viewed the 
nominal purchaser as a mere option holder rather than the owner of the property 
in substance.23 In order to enjoy the benefits and burdens of ownership of the 
property, the essential ingredients of true ownership for tax purposes, the nomi-
nal purchaser would have had to repay the nonrecourse promissory note. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the result of the Tax 
Court that· the taxpayer was not entitled to depreciation deductions by virtue of 
16 See Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-2 C.B. 24. 
17 See Woodsam Assoc., Inc. v Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952). 
18 See Lebowitz v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1990); Polakof v. Commissioner, 820 
F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988); Estate of Sydney Baron v. Commis-
sioner, 798 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1986); Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Commissioner v. Prussia 493 U.S. 901 (1989). 
19 See id. 
20 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309. 
21 See Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), affg, 64 T.C. 752 
(1975). See also cases cited infra notes 25 and 26. 
22 Estate of Franklin, 64 T.C. at 755. The taxpayer also sought to deduct the interest ostensibly 
paid to the seller on the nonrecourse promissory note. /d. 
23 /d. at 762. 
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ownership of the property nor to interest deductions for payments of nominal 
interest with respect to the nonrecourse promissory note. The theory employed. 
by the appeals court, however, differed. somewhat from the theory employed by 
the Tax Court. Unlike the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit viewed the purchaser as 
the owner of the property. However, it viewed the nonrecourse indebtedness as .a 
"contingent indebtedness" rather than a real· indebtedness.24 The nonrecourse 
note was. contingent .upon. the property increasing in value beyond the· face. 
amount of the note; bec:ause only when that occurred would the obligor have the 
incentive to pay the note. As.such, the nonrecourse liability was viewed by the 
court as. uncertain of ultimate payment and was, therefore, not sufficiently cer-
tain to be characterized as indebtedness. Thus,• notwithstanding that the form of. 
the transaction. would appear to yield a basis in the. property to the purchaser at 
least equal to the amount of the purchase money nonrecourse indebtedness, the 
court found that the substance of the transaction was different than the form. 
Accordingly, the taxpayer should not achieve the treatment that he would have 
been accorded had he made a true and actual investment in the property. Several 
subsequent cases have followed the lead of the Tax Court and Ninth Circuit in 
Estate of Franklin in .denying the purchaser basis fm: all25 or at least some26 of 
24 Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1047. 
25 Many cases have ~eld that a purchaser of property for inadequately secured nonrecourse indebt-
edness took no basis in the property by virtue of the indebtedness. See Brannen v. Commissioner, 
7~2 F.2d 695 (lith Cir. 1994) (holding t~at a taxpayer was not entitled to deduct depreciation 
attributable ·to increase in basis resulting from a ·nonrecourse. loan); Brouritas v. Commissioner, 692 
F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that nonrecourse notes· were too contingent to be included in 
basis); Lebowitz v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1990) (declining to assign full fair market 
value basis to taxpayer's coal rights when the fair market value of those rights was substantially less 
than the face value of the nonrecourse note); Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 
1992) (disallowing ·interest deductions on nonrecourse debt greatly in excess of the value of the 
interest purchased); Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1991) {holding that- nonrecourse 
indebtedness was not genuine); Bergstrom v. Commissioner, 37 Fed. Cl. 164 (1996) (holding that 
when nonrecourse debt exceeds reasonable approximation of fair value, debt. is disregarded for 
purpose of computing basis). See also Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58 (taking the position that an 
inadequately secured nonrecourse note is too contingent to be cla.ssified as.a genuine indebtedness). 
26 Some cases have held that a taxpayer was entitled to basis in the property equal to the value o( 
the property at the time of purchase, on the theory that the taxpayer had the incentive to pay a 
portion of the nonrecourse indebtedness in an amount equal to the value of the property (an amount 
that the lender would have an incentive to accept) in order to retain the property. Accordingly, that 
portion should be regarded as a true indebtedness. See Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3d'Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Commissioner v. Prussin, 493 U.S. 901 
(1989). The Service has announced that it will continue to litigate this issue. A.O.D. 1991-009 (Mar. 
29, 1991). See also Odend'hal v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1984). 
The Third Circuit, in Pleasant Summit Land Corp., interpreted Odend'hal as supporting its view, 
based upon language contained in the opinion. 748 F.2d at 912-14.1t is not at all clear, however, that 
the Odend'hal case supports the Third Circuit's. view, particularly in light of the result in that case, 
which affirmed the Tax Court's total exclusion of the nonrecourse debt from basis and its reliance on 
Brannen. See Brannen, 722 F.2d at 695. See also William D. Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 
949,953-54 (1983) (arguing in support of this approach) ... 
See also Regents Park Partners v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3131, 1992 T.C.M. (RIA) 'II 
92,336. The Tax Court allowed a purchaser of real property, which was subject to a nonrecourse 
mortgage held by U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development, the principal amount (plus 
accrued interest) that "unreasonably exceeded" the fair market value of the property, a basis equal to 
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the nonrecourse indebtednessY 
'' 
If the nonrecourse indebtedness were not respected, in whole or in part, at the 
time of purchase, then what treatment is accorded the nonrecourse indebtedness 
when the property is: (I) transferred to the lender in discharge of the indebted-
ness; (2) transferred to a third party who assumes the indebtedness; or (3) trans-
ferred to a third party who takes the property subject to it? To apply the holding 
in Tufts literally and, thereby, include ~he full amount of the nonrecourse indebt-
edness in the amount realized by the owner would treat the putative indebted-
ness inconsistently and create a break in tax logic. S!JCh a rule would treat the 
owner in an unfairly harsh manner. The Treasury issued regulations to deal with 
this problem in the interest of maintaining the preeminence of tax logic and 
seeking consistent treatment of the indebtedness throughout the transaction. 
Regulation section l.l 001-2, entitled "Discharge of Liabilities," recites the 
rule that the amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property in-
cludes the amount of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a 
result of the sale or disposition. In response to the Estate of Franklin case, the 
regulation provides the following: 
(3) Liability Incurred on Acquisition. In the case of a liability incurred by 
reason of the acquisition of the property, this section does not apply to the 
the value of the property, viewing the excess as contingent and; therefore, not includable in basis. 
The theory of this view focuses largely on the lender. The lender views the nonrecourse indebtedness 
as a liability of the debtor in the amount of the value of the property securing the indebtedness 
because that is the amount that is likely to be collected upon foreclosure. The Tax Court, however, 
did not view its holding as endorsing the holding in Pleasant Summii' Land Corp., because the 
taxpayer, before it had acquired the property subject to the mortgage, had managed the property and, 
in the court's view, had ample incentive to make further investments in the property rather than 
abandon the property./d. at 3131-37. 
27 The exact scope of the Estate of Franklin doctrine is still uncertain. The Estate of Franklin case 
involved a particularly abusive transaction. In the case, the taxpayer purportedly purchased property 
from the seller, consisting of a motel, paying what was termed prepaid interest and giving for the 
purchase price a nonrecourse promissory note, the face amount of which substantially exceeded the 
value of the property that secured the note. The note called for payments of principal and interest. 
Simultaneously with the sale, however, the taxpayer leased the property back to the seller under a 
net lease. All payments due from the taxpayer on the promissory note and made to the seller were 
offset by the rent payments made by the seller-lessee to the taxpayer under the net lease. The. seller 
continued to operate the property as a motel. One result of this arrangement was that the benefits and 
burdens of ownership regarding the opportunity to profit from an increase in value of the property 
and the risk of loss from the decrease in value of the property were in the hands of the original seller 
rather than the taxpayer, who was nominal owner. A second result was that control over the actual 
use of the property during the term of the lease rested in the hands of the seller. The court denied the 
taxpayer basis for the nonrecourse note portion of the purchase price, calling the note a mere 
contingent liability, the payment of which would await an increase in the value of the property that 
secured the note. 
The Estate of Franklin doctrine, however, has been applied in less abusive situations than existed 
in the case itself, that is, in situations when control of the .use of the property was in the hands of the 
nominal owner. The teaching of the Estate of Franklin case, as passed down through the years, has 
focused on the relationship between the value of the property and the principal amount of the 
nonrecourse indebtedness secured by the property. It appears that the seller's retention of the ability 
to use the property through a lease arrangement has receded in importance. 
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extent that such liability was not taken into account in detennining the transferor's 
basis for such property.28 . 
49 
The Treasury's decision 'to ignore the liability upon disposition of the prop-
erty if it was ignored· upon acquisition is consistent with the thrust and analysis 
in Estate of Franklin. The Estate of Franklin doctrine is one of substance over 
form: an item that is a .liapility' in name, but, in substance, does not give rise to 
an obligation of future payment will not be regarded as a liability for tax pur-
poses.29 A liability will be res'pected when it arises only if it reflects an actual 
obligation of future payment. The substance versus form analysis must be con-
ducted at the time the ,liabiHty arises, that is, when the property is purchased. 
Once the liability is disregardf~d as a sham, not worthy of being regarded as part 
of the purchase price, it should be disregarded when the owner is relieved of it. 
4. Modification of the Nonrecourse Liability 
As indicated above, a .mere decline in value of property that is subject to a 
nonrecourse liability, causing the property to becoine excess liability property, 
will not in i~self trigger a realization or a cancellation of indebtedness event. It is 
possible, however, and it has been asserted that, even absent a disposition of the 
property subject to the liability, an income generating event could occur with 
respect to the liability if the liability is modified. 30 
Case law has held that an exchange of old debt for new debt with an equiva-
lent face value does not result in cancellation of indebtedness income.31 This rule 
had been applied even if there were a change in the rate at which payments were 
to be made and the payment obligation became confined to a particular source. 32 
Old case law also held that the replacement of a recourse debt by a nonrecourse 
debt did not result. in debt cancellation income to the debtor, even when the 
taxpayer was in bankruptcy and it was unlikely-that the nonrecourse loan would 
be paid in fullY 
28 Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3). 
29 See generally Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 859, 865 (1982). ' .. 
30 See Sugin, supra note 2, at \45: 
31 See Great Western Power Co. of California v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 543, 546 (1936). 
32 See Alexander v. Commissioner, 61· T.C. 278 (1973), acq. 1974•2 C.B. I. In Alexander, the 
taxpayer incurred a debt to his former corporation, of which he was the majority shareholder. The 
obligation was purchased by the purchaser of the corporation's assets and, thereafter, made subject 
to a provision that it' was only payable out of commissions to be earned by the taxpayer from 
working for the succe.ssor to the corporation's business. Because it was reasonable to expect that the 
commissions would yield sufficient funds to pay the debt,· the debt remained a liability of the 
taxpayer and, therefore, did not give rise to income by reason of cancellation of indebtedness or 
otherwise when the corporation was subsequently liquidated. 
33 See Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, I T.C. 682,689-89 (1943), nonacq. 1943 C.B. 35 
(holding that the owner of property who substituted nonrecourse mortgage for pre-existing recourse 
mortgage that was satisfied approximately three years later by owner transferring property to lender 
when property was worth less than the· mortgage amount had gain only when the property was 
transferred and not at the time of the debt substitution). 
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a .. Significant Modification of Debt: In 'General.· The viability of these older 
cases, however, has been called into question by the recent Supreme. Court 
decision in Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner34 and the regulations 
issued in response to thatcase.35 Those regulations defined the concept of "sig-
nificant modification" of a debt instrument, which, if it occurs, would be treated 
as a taxable exchange by the hol~er of the debt in~trument. 36 A signifi~a~t· 
modification of the terms of the debt instrument includes modifications:such as a 
reduction in the ~tated principal amount ·of the debt37 or a. change 'fn · interest 
rqfe.38 In. general, there are no adverse tax consequences to the debtor from: a 
significant modification of a nonpublicly traded debt instrument as long as there 
is adequate stated interest39 and there has been no reduction in the stated princi-
pal .amount of the debt. The lack of adverse consequences results because the. 
debtor is deemed to issue a new debt instrument in satisfaction of'the existing 
indebtedness an·d the issuance is treated as if the debtor satisfied the indebted-
ness with an amount of money equal to the issue price of the new debt instru-
ment.40 The issue price is determined under the original issue discount (OlD) 
rules of.section 1274. If the modified instrument bears adequate interest,'the 
is~ue pri~e is simply the stated principal amount of the debt. If the modification 
involved· a reduction in the principal amount of the debt or of the interest rate to 
a rate below the applicable federal rate (AFR), then cancellation of indebtedness 
income resulting from the debt modification would be determined under the 
debt-for-debt exchange approach of the regulations. It would be equal to the 
excess, if any, of the adjusted issue price of the old obligation over the issue 
price of the new. obligation. The issue price of the new obligation is determined 
under the OlD rules of section 1274. As a general rule, when dealing with 
nonregularly traded debt, ~s long as the debt, after modification, bears adequ~te . 
stated interest, its face amount will be regarded as its issue price, and the modifi-
cation will not result in cancellation of indebtedness income. 
Ir' the debt modification, however; results in a deemed exchange of debt, it 
co.uld result in gain to a holder who. purchased that debt at a discount. The holder 
would be deemed to have exchanged his old; low-basis debt, for new, high issue 
price debt. The issue price of the nonpublidy traded new debt would be .the 
measure of the .holder~ s amount realized from the modification. The difference 
between that amount and the holder's basis would be includable as gain to the 
holder when the debt was repaid (or at the election of the holder, in the holder's 
income as OlD as the debt matured), even if it were unlikely that the debt would 
"499 u.s. 554, 566-67 (1991). 
35 Reg.§ 1.1001-3. · 
36 Reg. § I.IOOI-3(b). 
37 Reg. § I.IOOI-3(e)(l). 
38 Reg§ I.IOOI-3(e)(2). There is a de minimis rule to the effect that a small rate change will be 
ignored for these purposes. · · 
39 l.R.C. § 1274(c)(I)(A)(i); Reg.§ 1.1274-l(b). 
•o J.R.C. § IOS(e)(IO)(A); Reg.§ 1.1274-2. 
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ever be repaid in the full amount of its stated principal amount. Any such gain 
should be reportable under.the installment method.41 
41 To both the holder and the debtor, a significant modification of the debt constitutes an exchange. 
Pursuant to that exchange, the holder would be deemed to exchange his old, low..:basis debt for the 
new, modified debt. Regulation section 1.1001-1 (g)( I) provides that if a debt instrument is issued in 
exchange for property (the old debt would be considered property), the amount realized attributable 
to the debt instrument that is regarded as newly issued would be the issue price of the debt instru-
ment as determined under Regulation section 1.1273-2 or section 1.1274-2. 
Under those regulations, if the debt instruments were not publicly traded debt instruments or were 
not issued for publicly traded property, the issue price of the new debt would be determined under 
section 1274. Reg. § 1.1273-2(d)(l). Regulation section 1.1274-2, in tum, provides that 'the issue 
price of a debt instrument that .provides for adequate stated interest is the stated principal amount of 
the debt instrument. Reg. § 1.1274-2(b)(l). Thus, under Regulation section 1.1001-l(g)(l), the 
amount realized by the holder upon significant modification of the debt is the issue price of the 
modified debt, which is its principal stated amount. · 
Fortunately for the holder, the gain from the debt modification could be reportable under the 
installment method prescribed in section 453, as long as the holder is eligible for such treatment and 
the treatment is beneficial. 
Even if installment sale treatment were available, a receipt by the holder of partial repayment, 
either from operating funds of the debtor or through refinancing of a portion of the debt, could 
generate gain to the holder at that time. Only a p<)rtion of the holder's basis in the debt instrument 
could be used to offset the receipt. The portion of the basis available for that purpose, presumably, 
would be computed in proportion to the ratio of the repayment received to the issue price of the debt.· 
Thus, a debt purchased by the holder at a substantial discount and repaid in part, in an amount, say, 
equal to the holder's original purchase price for the debt could nevertheless generate a substantial 
amount of gain at time of partial repayment. This detriment would not arise, however, if the debt 
were repaid in full either at maturity or prior to maturity. 
Moreover, a portion of the holder's gain on the repayment could be treated as ordinary income 
rather than capital gain, because the excess of the stated principal amount or issue price of the debt 
instrument over the holder's basis in the instrument would constitute "accrued market discount" 
within the meaning of section 1276. Further, partial payments of principal received by the holder of 
an instrument that has accrued market discount are included in gross income as ordinary income to · 
the extent such payment does not exceed the accrued market discount on the debt. I.R.C. § 
1276(a)(3)(A). Under this section, accrued market discount is deemed earned ratably, at a constant 
rate, over the life of the debt instrument. The net impact of these rules on the holder of a debt 
instrument acquired at a deep discount is that a large amount of any principal payment received prior 
to the final payment on the debt will be regarded as income rather than return of basis, and that 
amount wiii likely be greatly disproportionate to the much smaller income amount that would have 
been realized by the holder if the actual fair market value of the debt instrument were viewed as its 
issue price rather than the grossly inflated stated principal amount as of the date of modification. 
Finally, it is possible that installment sale treatment would not be available to the holder under 
section 453(b)(2), or that the holder, although eligible, would be precluded from the financial 
benefits of such treatment under section 453A. Section 453(b)(2) excludes dealer dispositions, de-
fined in section 453(1), from eligibility for installment treatment. Dealer dispositions include the 
disposition of personal property by a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal 
property of the same type on the installment plan. Some lenders may fall into this classification, 
however unusual it may appear. 
More importantly, however, holders that engage in this kind of transaction involving debt instru-
ments with substantial principal amounts, if not values, would be subject to section 453A, which, in 
effect, deprives the installment seller of the benefits of installment sale treatment by imposing an 
interest charge on the present value of the tax deferral made possible by the installment treatment. 
The special interest charge rule applies only if certain conditions are met, the most important of 
which in this context is that the face amount of all such obligations held by the taxpayer which arose 
during and are outstanding as of the close of such taxable year, exceeds $5 million. See l.R.C. § 
453A(b)(2)(B). 
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b. Significant Modification of Debt: Nonrecourse Debt. For years, it was 
conventional wisdom that the modification of a nonrecourse debt secured by real 
estate would not give rise to cancellation of indebtedness income as long as the 
stated principal amount of the debt instrument remained unchanged, even if the 
indebtedness was undersecured before modification and remained undersecured 
after the modification.42 Regulations were proposed, however, under section 
1274, which called this wisdom into question. Under Regulation section 1.1001-
3, a significant modification of undersecured nonrecourse debt would be deemed 
to be the issuance of a new debt instrument in satisfaction of the old debt 
instrument. If the nonrecourse debt instrument, as modified, is debt, Regulation 
section l.IOOI-3 references section 1274 and the regulations thereunder to deter-
mine the tax consequences of the exchange.43 
Regulation section 1.1274-1 (a) provides that section 1274 and the regulations 
thereunder apply to any debt instrument issued in consideration for the sale or 
exchange of property. For purposes of the section and the regulations, property 
includes debt instruments. Under the general rule, the fair market value of a debt 
instrument that bears adequate interest and is not publicly traded is its stated 
principal amount. Thus, in general, as long as the modification leaves that amount 
unchanged, there would be no tax consequence to the debtor. 
Regulation section 1.1274-l(b), however, provides an exception for certain 
debt instruments, even if they have adequate stated interest and no OlD, if the 
debt instrument is issued in a "potentially abusive situation," as defined in 
Regulation section l.l274-3.44 Regulation section 1.1274-3 defines "potentially 
abusive situations" to include any situation involving nonrecourse financing. If 
the exception applies, then notwithstanding the general rule regarding the issue 
price of_a replacement nonrecourse debt instrument as the stated principal amount, 
the issue price of a replacement nonrecourse debt instrument will be deemed to 
be the fair market value of the property received in the exchange. In other 
words,· the issue price will be the value of the replacement nonrecourse debt, 
reduced by any additional amount paid. Presumably, the fair market value of 
undersecured replacement nonrecourse debt would be the fair market value of 
the collateral serving as security for the debt.45 If that were the end of the 
analysis, the result would be cancellation of indebtedness income to the debtor 
in the amount of the excess of the liability over the value of the collateral. 
Importantly, however, the operating rules set forth in Regulation section l.l274-
3(b), which were added when the regulations became final, create an exception 
to the exception by specifically providing that: nonrecourse financing does not 
include an exchange of a nonrecourse debt instrument for an outstanding re-
42 See C. Ronald Kalteyer, Real Estate Workouts-Original Issue Discount Implications of Troubled 
Debt Restructurings, 43 TAX LAW. 579,580 (1990). 
•> Reg § 1.1274. 
44 Reg. § l.l274-l(b)(l)(iii) . 
., Reg. § l.l274-2(b)(3). 
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course or nonrecourse debt instrument.46 Thus, the regulations permit replace-
ment nonrecourse debt that is substituted for other nonrecourse debt to be treated 
as issued for its stated principal amount. It follows that the stated principal 
amount of a modified nonrecourse debt would constitute its issue price and that 
the mere modification of an undersecured nonrecourse debt that bears sufficient 
interest would not give rise to cancellation of indebtedness income to the issuer. 
This conclusion will hold true as long as the modified debt constitutes debt. If it 
does not constitute debt, then the section 1274 regulations are not applicable to 
the modification. 
The regulations also provide for different treatment if the modified debt con-
stitutes a contingent debt· instrument. A nonrecourse debt that bears adequate 
fixed interest, however, would not be regarded as a contingent debt instrument 
even though it was undersecured, as long as the debt did not contain an addi-
tional term providing for an "equity kicker" or other indicia of equity ownership. 
Regulation section 1.127 5-4 provides several exceptions to the treatment ac-
corded to con~ingent payment debt instruments issued for nonpublicly traded 
property.47 Most notably, the regulation does not apply to a debt instrument 
subject to Regulation section 1.1272-1 (d), debt instruments that provide for a 
fixed yield.48 That regulation states that a debt instrument that provides for one 
or more contingent payments, such as payments that are dependent upon avail-
able cash of the owner of the property, which may not be determinable at the 
time the debt is modified, will nevertheless be considered noncontingent if all 
possible payment schedules under the terms of the instrument result in the same 
fixed yield.49 The regulation then provides the following: 
For example, the yield i:>f a debt instrument with principal payments that are 
fixed in total amount but that are uncertain as to time (such as a demand loan) 
is the stated interest rate if the issue price of the instrument is equal to the stated 
principal amount and interest is paid or compounded at a fixed rate over the 
entire term of the instrument. 5° 
Further, a debt instrument is not regarded as providing for an alternative pay-
ment schedule merely because there is a possibility of impairment of a payment(s) 
46 Reg. § 1.1274-3(b)(l). Regulation section 1.1273-3(c) gives the Commissioner the authority to 
designate other non-abusive situations, even if otherwise described under the general rule as a 
situation involving an abusive situation, because they do not have the effect of significantly misstat-
ing basis or amount realized. This additional power given· to the Commissioner provides an indica-
tion of the kind of abuses with which the regulations are concerned, namely, the abuses of the OlD 
rules that would cause an overstatement of basis or perhaps an overstatement or understatement of 
amount realized. Further, if the issuer makes a determination that the new instrument is not issued in 
a potentially abusive situation, that determination is binding on the holder of that instrument, unless 
the holder discloses on its tax return that it is taking a contrary position. Reg. § 1.1274-3(d). 
Regardless of the issuer's determination or the holder's compliance with that determination, the 
Service is still free to challenge it. 
47 Reg. § 1.1275-4(a)(2). 
48 Reg. § 1.1275-4(a)(2)(iii). 
49 Reg. § 1.1272-l(d). 
50 /d. See also Reg. § 1.1272-1 (j), Ex. (I 0). 
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by insolvency, default, or similar circumstances.51 
Thus, a modified nonrecourse note, even if significantly undersecured, will 
not implicate the contingent payment debt regulations. Further, it will be treated 
as .an indebtedness without OlD as long as the modified instrument continues to 
bear the original principal amount and a fixed rate of interest at least equal to the 
applicable federal rate, and does not otherwise contain equity flavored attributes.52 
, c. Possibility that Modified Nonrecourse Debt Does Not Constitute Debt, in 
Whole or in Part. When an undersecured nonrecourse liability is substantially 
modified and is, therefore, deemed replaced by another undersecured nonrecourse 
liability of the same nominal face amount (bearing adequate interest), it is pos-
sible that the new liability would be evaluated based on its relationship to the 
value of the property at the time that new liability is deemed to arise rather than 
on the basis of its stated principal amount. In theory, this possibility could arise 
by application of the Estate of Franklin doctrine. Under that doctrine, the liabil-
ity could be viewed as wholly or partly contingent, depending upon the theory of 
the Estate of Franklin doctrine that is applied, with the result that all or a portion 
of the liability would be deemed cancelled. 
Alternatively, a taxable event could occur if the original debt were viewed as 
having been replaced by equity. Under that circumstance, the modification could 
result in a deemed foreclosure of the property.53 
The debt modification regulations54 are far from clear on this point. While not 
dealing with this question specifically, they provide that a modification of a debt 
instrument that results in an instrument or property right that is not debt for 
federal income tax purposes is a significant modification.55 The regulations fur-
ther provide, however, that for purposes of the foregoing rule as it affects re-
course debts, any deterioration in the financial condition of the obligor between 
the issue date of the unmodified instrument and the date of modification as it 
relates to the obligor's ability to repay the debt is not taken into account unless, 
in connection with the modification, there is a substitution of a new obligor or 
the addition or deletion of a co-obligor. 56 Instead, the regulations instruct us to 
51 Reg.§ 1.1272-l(c)(l). 
52 A problem also could arise if the modified debt instrument bears an interest rate that is clearly 
excessive. The concept of "potential abusive situation" under Regulation section 1.1274-3(a) in-
cludes a debt instrument with clearly excessive interest. Reg. § 1.1274-3(a)(2)(iv). It is problematic 
whether a significantly undersecured nonrecourse debt could ever provide for "clearly excessive 
interest" in light of the fact that clearly excessive interest occurs if the interest charge is .clearly 
greater than the arm's-length amount of interest that would have been charged in a cash lending 
transaction between the same two parties. Reg. § 1.1274-3(b)(3). It is possible, however, that an 
interest rate substantially above the applicable federal rate that ensures that no return could ever go. 
to the owner of the property may fall into that category. In any event, there is no express exception 
from the potentially abusive situation category for instruments bearing clearly excessive interest as 
there is for an exchange of nonrecourse debt for nonrecourse debt. 
53 See Sugin, supra note 2 at 144. 
54 Reg. § 1.1001-3. 
''Reg.§ 1.1001-3(e)(S)(i). 
S6Jd. 
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ignore the financial condition of the debtor. They are silent,. however, with 
regard to the importance of the value of the collateral 'when a recourse debt is 
significantly modified. ' 
Presumably, a rule similar to the recourse debt rule would apply 'in the case of 
a· nonrecourse indebtedness,· and factors affecting the likelihood of repayment, 
such as the value of·the property that secures the debt,.should be·ignored. Under 
this analysis, there would appear to be no room for the application of the Estate 
of Franklin doctrine to disregard the replacement note as lacking substance even 
though its principal amount exceeds the value of the· property that secures it. 
This rule make sense because the modification of an excess liability is not an 
event that causes it to become· an instrument that is not properly classified as· 
debt. Rather, it is the reduction in value of the underlying security that could 
have this effect. As a result, mere modification of. the instrument should not 
trigger a deemed conversion of debt to equity with the resultant cancellation of 
indebtedness or deemed foreclosure consequences. · 
This conclusion is consistent with the history of the ·relevant regulation. As 
discussed above, the modification of a nonpublicly traded honrecourse·debt that 
does not reduce its principal amount or its interest rate below the APR is not 
regarded as a potentially abusive situation and, therefore, is governed by the 
general rule of Regulation section 1.1274-'1 (a). Under that rule, there will be no 
cancellation of indebtedness income. The exception for nonrecourse debt modi-
fications represents a significant change from the regulations published by the 
Treasury in proposed form. Under the earlier version Of the regulations, a "po-
tentially abusive situation" would have included all nonrecourse liabilities: Un-
der the proposed rule, the modification of a ·nonrecourse liability; even if it 
remained nonrecourse, would have caused the issue price of the new indebted-
ness to be equal to the fair market value of the indebtedness rather than the 
stated principal amount, as would have been the case with recourse liabilities. 
As such, the determination of the tax consequences of the modification would 
have required an appraisal of the collateral. This rule· was changed in response to 
comments on the proposed version,57 when the regulations were finalized. The 
exception described above was added to the regulations when they were final-
ized. 
The abandonment of the harsher rule contained in the proposed section 1274 
regulations indicates the Treasury's acceptance of the position that the modifica-
tion of undersecured nonrecourse liabilities should be permitted without adverse 
tax consequences to the debtor. The final rule permitted the stated principal 
amount of the modified ut:~dersecured nonrecourse liability (which bore adequate 
interest) to be its principal amount, rather than limiting the principal arriount to 
the fair market value of the collateral securing the liability. That decision should 
be regarded as incorporating the acceptance that an undersecured nonrecourse 
s7 See COMM. ON SALES AND FINANCIAL TRANSACfiONS, ABA TAX SEC., Report on the Proposed 
Original Issue Discount Regulations, 40 TAx LAw. 481,509 (1987). 
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liability should be regarded as a debt, without regard to the value of the collat-
eral that secures the liability. Otherwise, the Treasury would have made a totally 
hollow concession, because there could never be a modification of an undersecured 
nonrecourse liability that was not also a taxable event to the debtor if the new 
liability were considered as equity rather than debt merely because it was 
undersecured. 
Further, there is substantial uncertainty whether a regulation under section 
1001 could itself trigger tax consequences to the debtor, even if there were 
substantial modification of the debt instrument. 58 Debts are normally not consid-
ered property to the debtor. Rather, section 1001 should be applicable to ex-
changes of debt by the creditor only. Therefore, in the context of debt modifica-
tions, the section should not result in tax consequences to the debtor. 59 
On the other hand, a recent article by Linda Sugin takes the position that 
under current law, a debt restructuring that allows nonrecourse debt to remain 
undersecured would be treated as a constructive foreclosure, that is, as a transfer 
of property in satisfaction of the debt.60 Under that view, the tax consequences of 
such a restructuring would be governed by Tufts. Sugin's analysis of current law 
proceeds as follows. 
When an excess liability is restructured in order to relieve the pressure on the 
borrower to make current payments to service the debt, such as when the parties 
agree to defer some of the interest due for several years without changing the 
yield on the instrument, the restructuring would constitute a significant modifi-
cation of the instrument within the meaning of Regulation section 1.1001-3. A 
significant modification, it is argued, has the effect of treating the entire transac-
tion as if a new debt instrument is substituted for the old debt. The new instru-
ment must be evaluated based on the circumstances that exist at the time of 
modification. Thus, if the new instrument, even if in the form of debt, consti-
tutes equity in substance or would otherwise not be considered true debt, then a 
taxable event would occur for both lender and borrower. Further, the principle of 
Estate of Franklin would be applied at the time of the restructuring to test 
whether the new debt should be treated as true debt. 
Under this analysis, the restructured nonrecourse debt, if undersecured, could 
be treated in one of two ways. First, it could be regarded as debt only to the 
58 See TASK FoRcE, ABA TAx SEC., Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-3: Modifications of Debt Instruments 
[Parts 1-V], 47 TAx LAw. 987, 1028 (1994) [hereinafter ABA TASK FoRCE]. 
59 The legislative history, however, indicates that the standard to be applied to the holder with 
respect to gain or loss determination when a debt is modified should also apply to the issuer with 
regard to whether cancellation of indebtedness income is realized. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 964, at 
1098 (1990) ("[E]ither or both COD or OlD may be created in a debt-for-debt exchange that 
qualifies as a reorganization, so long as the exchange qualifies as a realization event under Section 
1001 for the holder."). See Mary K. Wold, A Comprehensive Tax Guide for Corporation Workouts, 
in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SP!N-OFFS, JOINT VENTuims, FINANCINGS, 
REORGANIZATION, AND REsTRUCfURINGS 1996, at 569, 614 (PLl Tax Law and Estate Planning Course 
Handbook Series No, 394, 1996). 
60 See Sugin, supra note 2, at 117. 
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extent of the fair market value of the security. Second, it could be disregarded as 
debt entirely. In the first case; the restructuring would have the effect of cancel-
ling the indebtedness to the extent that it exceeds the value of the security. This 
treatment would result in cancellation of indebtedness income to the owner. in 
the amount of the excess. In.the second case, the restructuring would.constitute a 
deemed foreclosure of the property. 
An example will help illustrate this ·analysis.6•1 Assume that the taxpayer origi-
nally purchased the property for $10,000,000, paying $1 ,000,000 in cash and 
$9,000,000 in the form of a nonrecourse indebtedness, either given to the seller 
or borrowed from a third party.'Then, assume that the property declines in value 
to $5,000,000. Suppose that the debt was significantly modified within the mean-
ing of the applicable regulations.62 Under the first possible analysis, the debt 
modification would result in $4,000,000 of cancellation of indebtedness income 
to the owner of the property. 
Sugin, however, rejects .this result in favor of the second possibility.· Under 
her analysis, the principle of the Estate of Franklin would be applied to 
recharacterize the putative new debt as, in substance, an ownership interest of 
the lender in the property. This recharacterization would occur because the 
lender would,have the significant attributes of ownership. The risk of loss-the 
risk of the remaining $5,000,000 in value from the example above-would rest 
completely on the lender. In addition, the opportunity to profit-the next 
$4,000,000 of·appreciation, as· well as current earnings on the property that 
would be used to pay .interest arid·to.repay principal from the·example above~ 
would belong to the lender. If, as a result of the modification of the old debt, the 
lender becomes the owner for tax purposes, then it follows that the nominal 
owner must have transferred that ownership to the lender, because it is impos-
sible for both nominal owner and lender to be regarded as the owner of the 
property at the same time.63 That constructive transfer occurs in satisfaction of 
the debt, as would be the case in foreclosure. The owner would treat the transac-
tion as a sale. The lender. would be permitted a bad debt deduction for the 
amount of the debt that has remained unpaid. 
Sugin reaches this result by combining the principle of Estate of Franklin 
with general notions of debt and equity and the provisions of Regulation section 
1.1001-3 dealing with debt modifications. The resulting concoction is then an-
nounced as a statement of current law.64 The conclusion, however, Jacks case 
law authority, which is explained simply by reference to the fact that "taxpayers 
have no incentive to bring this issue to the government's attention and the 
government has insufficient information to' identify undersecured restructured 
debt."65 
61 The example is taken from Sugin, supra note 2, at 164-65. 
62 This modification could occur in a number of ways, including a small interest rate change or 
even an abandonment of the requirement that all interest be paid currently. 
63 See Sugin, supra note 2, at. 127-129. 
64 See Sugin, supra note 2, at 116-17, 118, 127, 128, 129-37. 
•s See Sugin, supra note 2, at 116-17. 
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Sugiri' s argument is inconsistent with Regulation· sections 1.1001-3 and 1.1274-
l(b), when read in the light of their drafting history. Moreover, it does not' 
represent a good· policy choice and, therefore, should not be accepted as the 
likely result of future judicial analysis. Iris best understood and deconstructed 
on its own terms. · ·, · i· 
First,· her argument is grounded on the assertions that a restructuring of debt 
must.be examinea as a modification under sectidn 1001 and that any· significant· 
change in terms is treated as a realization event to both lender and borrower. The· 
section l.l00lc3 ·regulations were written in response to Cottage Savings Asso-· 
ciation v. Commissioner.66 That case held that an exchange· of one package of 
debt instruments for another similar package of debt instruments of equivalent 
value but with different debtors constituted a taxable exchange, which permitted 
Cottage Savings to realize a loss. The' value of those debts had declined ·as a 
result of the increase in market interest rates since the time of origination of the 
loans. The Treasury? s response to the case was'to provide detailed guidance on 
when a modification of an existing debt should be treated as so .substantial so as 
to be considered· an exchange of the old debt for a new-debt. From·the lender's 
point of view, the exchange treatment gives rise to the opportunity to realize a 
loss· if the deemed value of the new debt is less than the basis of the old debt.67 
The regulations, however, go further than merely setting' forth the conse-
quences to 'the lender. Rather, they purport to set forth the treatment of the 
borrower as well. This ·treatment will occur even though the debt does riot 
constitute "property" to the borrower, the normal subject matter of section 1001. 
Normally, one would expect to see regulations affecting the borrower issued 
under section 108 dealing with cancellation of indebtedness income, an area of 
the tax law with extensive regulations. It is not at all dear that a debt modifica-
tion that constitutes an exchange for'the lender must constitute an "exchange" or 
realization event of any kind to the borrower. Symmetry is neither required nor, 
I would suggest, called for in this context.68 
The regulations as interpreted by Sugin, however, have an even broader scope. 
Even though they are interpretative regulations under section 1001, directed 
primarily at the 1ende(s tax consequences,'Sugin's expansive interpretation of 
them would change well settled riotioris of realization that have been a funda-
mental aspect of the federal income tax system since· its inception. The're have 
been many cases, including several Supreme Court cases,69 that have established 
the position that before· there can· be recognition of gain there must be realiza-
tion. Realization requires a· sale or other disposition of the property. A mete 
decline or increase in its value without' more does not constitute an everit of 
I ,. \ ·,,, 
66 499 u.s. 554 (1991). 
67 The basis of the old debt is generally its principal amount if the lender originated the debt. 
68 See ABA TASK FoRcE, supra note 58, at 1023. 
69 See Eisner v. McComber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Helvering, v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1990); 
Cottage Savings Assoc. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 
300 (1983). . 
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realization. To deem a foreclosure when there has been no actual transfer by the 
taxpayer of ownership of property at the very least would require a clear and 
incontrovertible statement in the. regulations, .which is absent. Further, such a 
change in established principles of realization may very well be. beyond the 
power of mere interpretative regulations. Altering the rule of realization should 
require legislative change, and, indeed in some areas, Congress has made such 
changes.70 But it is not likely that such a long and. well established precept of 
income taxation wo1,1ld be changed by interpretative regulations, and it is even. 
more unlikely that the section 1.1001-3 regulations would have effected such a 
change without being explicit about it. 
Moreover, as a matter of policy, the wisdom of a constructive forecil;>sure rule 
is questionable. A deemed. foreclosure rule raises . several interesting and 
unresolvable issues. Suppose, in the above example, the property, subsequent to 
the debt modification, increases in value back to its original $10,000,000. The 
debtor, who has remained the owner of the property for state law purposes and 
in control of the property, now has equity in the property of $1,000,000. At that. 
point, presumably, the debtor should be deemed to be the owner of the prop~rty 
for tax purposes. To accomplish that result, one WO!Jld have to construct a 
deemed purchase of the property at some point around the time that the property's 
value increased aboye $9,000,000. If the taxpayer became the owner at that 
point by deemed purchase, then the lender would have become a deemed seller 
with the attendant gain consequences of the sale of property, which had a basis· 
in the hands of the lender of $5,000,000, its deemed acquisition price. The value 
of the property would have to be monitored at all times in order to determine, in 
any given year, whether the nominal owner or lender was the owner for tax 
purposes and, therefore, ·entitled to depreciation. If the precise value of the 
property were in doubt, caution would require that both owner and lender deduct 
depreciation amounts to ensure that neither is whipsawed by the Service in 
future audit. 
Further, a deemed foreclosure rule draws a greater distinction between re-
course debt and nonrecourse debt than is of~en warranted. Suppose the property 
in the above example was purchased with cash and recourse debt in the amount 
of $9,000,000, but the debtor became insolvent by the time the property's value 
declined to $5,000,000. As a matter of substance, the lender would view the 
transaction as no different than if the debt were nonrecourse. In both cases, the 
lender would be looking to the property as the sole means of recovering the 
amount loaned. Presumably, if the property declined in value to $5,000,000 and 
the debt were modified to defer payments, a deemed foreclosure arguably would 
result, following Sugin's logic, because, in substance, the lender has all of the 
downside risk and virtually all of the upside potential. Yet, the regulations under 
section 1001 instruct us to ignore the financial condition of the debtor in deter-
70 See, e.g., mark-to-market rules of section 475. 
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mining whether the new, modified instrument constitutes a property right that is 
not debt for federal income tax purposes.7' Consistency in logic with that applied 
in the recourse situation would require the application of a similar rule in the 
nonrecourse situation. Such a rule would ignore the value of the underlying 
property that secures a nonrecourse indebtedness. 
Sugin's argument is, at base, an argument against the current, well-settled 
general treatment of nonrecourse indebtedness as true debt at the time both of 
the purchase of property and its disposition. The argument incorporates a dis-
comfort with the treatment of nonrecourse indebtedness as true debt. 72 However, 
it is not at all clear that adequately secured nonrecourse indebtedness falls more 
on the equity side of the continuum than the debt side, and the tax law has not 
viewed it as such. Under current tax law, dating from Crane73 to the more recent 
Tufts74 case, nonrecourse indebtedness used to acquire property at least equal in 
value to the amount of the indebtedness has been regarded as true debt, and the 
purchaser, not the lender, is regarded as the exclusive owner of the property for 
tax purposes. Nevertheless, Sugin has issued a call to elevate economic sub-
stance over form in determining the tax treatment of nonrecourse indebtedness. 
In the tax law, form continues to be very important, not simply to provide 
certainty, which itself is an important goal of the tax Jaw. Form carries with it 
important rights under state law. For example, the legal and, for state law pur-
poses, equitable owner of property has all of the statutorily protected and com-
mon Jaw rights of ownership for nontax purposes. These include the right to 
control the use of the property, the right to exclude, and the right to transfer the 
property. Federal bankruptcy law protects those rights as well. In bankruptcy, it 
is not unusual for a secured creditor, whose secured loan greatly exceeds the 
value of the property, to be crammed down and repaid in bankruptcy an amount 
equal to the value of the property and no more. It is an oversimplification of 
ownership to look simply at who bears the risk of a decline in the value of 
property. 
It may be argued that "who is the owner" is not the question that needs to be 
answered for purposes of assigning tax attributes from the property, such as 
depreciation deductions. Rather, the inquiry may focus on the bearer Of the risk 
of economic Joss. Under that view, the risk of loss, and not "ownership," would 
determine the taxpayer who can depreciate the property for tax purposes.75 
Determining who bears the risk of loss, however, is by no means easy. For 
example, if the property that secured the nonrecourse indebtedness in the amount 
of $9,000,000 declined in value to $8,500,000, but the debtor continued to make 
71 Reg.§ 1.1001-3(e)(S)(i). 
72 Sugin is far from alone in this discomfort. See Diane M. Anderson, Note, Federal Income Tax 
Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1498 (1982). 
7J Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947). 
74 Tufts, 461 U.S. at300. 
75 See Noel B. Cunningham and Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolu-
tionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAx L. REv. 725 (1992). 
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mortgage payments as required under the promissory note, it is not at all clear 
that the economic loss from the reduction in value is borne by the lender. To the 
contrary, if the lender continues to receive payments on the debt from the debtor, 
it is hard to see why the lender has borne any risk of loss. At most, if the debt 
matures and the debtor transfers the property to the lender in lieu of making full 
payment of the liability, then the value of the property at that time; if it is less 
than the remaining balance of the loan, produces a loss to the lender. However, 
it is not until that time that the lender has been financially disadvantaged. Many 
things can happen between the making of a loan and its maturity, including an 
increase or decrease in value of the property securing the loan. Further, even if 
the property's value does riot increase, the debtor may choose to retain the 
property to avoid dislocation, even though the property is worth less than the 
balance of the debt.76 
Moreover, tax depreciation may have nothing to do with any decrease in 
value of the property, because tax depreciation is computed mechanically with-
out reference to actual loss of value established by appraisals from year to year.77 
Indeed, even though the property is being depreciated for tax purposes, it may 
actually be increasing in value. Allocating depreciation deductions to the lender 
based upon a risk analysis as to who, hypothetically, bears the risk of loss, may 
bring one no closer to conforming tax treatment to economic substance. There is 
no reason to allocate depreciation deductions to the lender, instead of the debtor, 
on the basis of a risk bearing analysis, because there may have been no eco-
nomic loss to be borne by anyone.78 
Thus, risk of loss can be divided between debtor and lender and, indeed, 
among debtor, lender, and guarantor in any number of ways. Determining who 
bears the risk of loss in any administratively manageable way for purposes of 
allocating depreciation may not be feasible under a tax system that seeks to be 
practical and does not require annual appraisals of property to determine tax 
consequences. On balance, it would appear that the tax attributes of ownership, 
such as depreciation, should be assigned to the taxpayer who is regarded as the 
"owner" of the property, notwithstanding the shortcomings of that approach, and 
indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has applied that approach.79 
There are circumstances, of course, when the taxpayer employs a particular 
form of a transaction to accomplish a tax result that is inappropriate under the 
true economic substance of the transaction. For example, the taxpayer in Estate 
of Franklin purportedly purchased property for an amount promised to be paid 
in the future, secured only by the purchased property. The taxpayer did not even 
have the opportunity to use the property, a motel, because it was leased back to 
76 Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: The Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX L. REv. 
40 I, 434-35 (1989). 
77 ld. at 435-37. 
78 ld. 
79 See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (determining the owner in sale 
leaseback arrangement). 
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the putative seller. Under those extreme circumstances, when the abuse sought 
by the participants in the transaction is clear, courts have ignored the form of the 
transaction and attempted to impose tax consequences based upon its economic 
substance. The application of substance over form, however, has generally been 
limited to clear cases when courts have sought to prevent an abuse. The sub-
stance over form doctrine must be applied carefully and restrictively because it 
is not always clear what the substance of a transaction. is, although it is generally. 
clear what the form is from referring to the governing documents, Thus, sub-
stance over form is an extreme remedy, generally only available to the govern~· 
ment in attacking a transaction as being different than its form80 in order. to 
prevent taxpayer abuse. 
In contrast to the normal substance over form application, no abuse occurs 
when a nonrecourse liability that exceeds the value of the property that secures 
the liability is modified to reduce the current pay rate of the debt which, in all 
likelihood, is already in default because of the failure of the debtor to make 
payments. Perhaps it could be argued that the owner of the property should 
realize any gain inherent in the property at the time that the value of the property 
falls below the outstanding liability, or perhaps at the time that the owner de-
faults on the liability, so that the lender has the legal right to institute foreclosure 
proceedings to reclaim the property. Those circumstances do not constitute events 
of realization under current law, however, because realization requires disposi-
tion of the property itself. Similarly, modification of the debt, which, if any-
thing, causes the lender to relinquish rights to the property such as the right to 
receive current payments on the debt, and thereby, makes it more likely that the 
owner of the property can retain that ownership, is hardly an event that should 
trigger realization. 
Sugin's argument to elevate substance over form, so that a taxpayer who 
bears the risk of decline in value of property is deemed the owner of the prop-
erty, represents a proposal for legislative consideration that is not entirely with-
out merit. But it also has drawbacks and inconsistencies with basic principles of 
current tax law that are generally accepted and necessary to keep the tax system 
administrable. 
Finally, the Estate of Franklin doctrine goes to the determination of the 
purchaser's basis in the purchased property for depreciation purposes. Once the 
owner is established as the owner of the property for tax purposes and the 
owner's basis is determined to include the nonrecourse debt because the Estate 
of Franklin doctrine is nqt applicable, then. subsequent changes to the debt 
should have no impact on the basis of the property, absent specific statutory 
so Taxpayers are generally stuck with their form. See, e.g., Federal Nat'! Mortgage Ass'n v. 
Commissioner, 896 F.2d 580,587 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Estate of Durkin v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 561, 
566 (1992). See generally Isenbergh, supra note 29, at 881 (questioning the appropriateness of 
employing the substance over form approach in many situations in which it has been applied). 
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authorization.81 For example, if the property in our example increased in· value 
from $10,000,000 to $15,000,000 and was refinanced with nonrecourse-·indebt-
edness of $13,000,000; · $9,000,000 of which was used to repay the original 
nonrecourse mortgage, the basis of the purchased property would remain un-
changed.82 
The original debt is includable in basis because it constitutes a part. of the 
purchase price 'of·the property. Whether it· remains in force, increases, or is 
repaid; it ·would not affect further the basis of the property, which has already 
been established. Nor should a cancellation of a portion of that debt affect the 
basis of the property,. unless there were explicit statutory permission to do so. 83 
Even if the debt ceases to be regarded as debt, the basis in the property, and, 
therefore, ownership of the property, should remain unaffected. All of the fore-
going consequences follow and, indeed, should follow as long as the nonrecourse 
indebtedness and any substitute indebtedness is treated consistently throughout 
its:.ex:istence. 
B. The Partnersbip Situation 
l. In General 
.·In general, a partnershfp computes its income or loss as if it were an ~ntity,84 
bt1t the partnership itself is not subject to tax.85 Rather, its profits, losses, and in 
some case, specific components of each, referred to as "items," pass through to 
the partners and are subject to tax at the partner level. 86 
The interaction of partnership ownership and the tax consequences to its 
partners implicates various secti~ns of Subchapter K, dealing with partnerships. 
The Subchapter K sections that are prominent include sections 705, 722 (to 
which section 705 refers), and 742. These sections deal with the determination 
of basis of a partner's interest. In general, they compute a partner's basis in his 
partnership interest by reference to money or property contributed to the partner-
ship, subject to various adjustments and, with respect to a partner who acquires 
his interest in a partnership other than by contribution, provide that the basis of 
the partnership interest is determined under the normal basis sections in the 
income tax laws discussed previously. 
81 S~e section 108(e)(5) for an exampie of statutory authorization to treat a cancellation of a 
portion of purchase money indebtedness held by the seller of the property as a reduction in the 
purchase price of the property. See also section 108(a)(l )(d) dealing with reduction in qualified real 
property indebtedness. which excludes from income the cancellation of the portion of the debt. but 
which requires the downward adjustment in basis of depreciable property. 
82 See Woodsam Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). Realization of the 
gain represented by the additional borrowing would await the disposition of the property. The 
unchanged historic basis would ensure that the cash withdrawal would not avoid imposition of a tax 
upon disposition of the property. 
83 See supra note 81. 
84 1.R.C. § 703. 
85 1.R.C. § 70 I. 
86 l.R.C. § 702. 
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When partnership liabilities are involved, section ·752 provides for the effect 
that those partnership liabilities have on a partner's basis in his partnership 
interest ("outside basis"). Briefly, any increase in a partner's share ofthe liabili-
ties of a partnership is considered a contribution of money by the partner to the 
partnership and is, thereby, included in that partner's outside basis. Conversely, 
any decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership is considered a 
distribution of money to the partner by the partnership and, thereby, reduces that 
partner's outside basis.87 
Subsections (c) and (d) of section 752 provide further rules, the effect of 
which are less clear. Specifically, subsection (c), entitled "Liability to Which 
Property is Subject," provides as follows: 
(c) For purposes of this section, a liability to which property is subject shall, to 
the extent of the fair market value of such property, be considered as a liability 
of the owner of the property.88 
The qualifier, "to the extent of the fair market value of such property," and how 
one treats any excess liability over the fair market value of the property securing 
the liability, raise interesting issues of interpretation.89 . 
In addition, subsection (d), entitled "Sale or Exchange of an Interest," pro-
vides as follows: 
(d) In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, liabilities 
shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or 
exchange of property not associated with partnerships.90 
81 I.R.C. § 752(a), (b). 
88 I.R.C. § 752(c) . 
.. Consistent with section 752(c), the regulations under section 704(b) provide that property con-
tributed by a partner to a partnership should be credited to that partner's capital account in the 
amount of the fair market value of the property, without taking section 770l(g) into account. Reg.§ 
I. 704-l(b)(2)(iv)(d)( I). Similarly, the regulations provide that the partnership's capital accounting 
require a partner's capital account to be decreased by the fair market value of the property distrib-
uted by the partnership, also without taking section 770\(g) into account to such partner. Reg. § 
1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(e)(l). The applicability of section 770\(g) to those situations reflects the preemi-
nence of section 752(c). · 
Based upon the Supreme Court's discussion of section 752(c) in Tufts, commentators have sug-
gested that the applicability of section 752(c) should be limited to contributions to a partnership of 
property subject to a nonrecourse liability and distributions of such property from a partnership to a 
partner. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in holding the entire amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness 
was included in amount realized, specifically suggested this limitation and did not feel bound to limit 
the determination of amount realized on the disposition of the property by virtue of the nonrecourse 
liability to the fair market value of the property. 
Professor Stafford, in commenting on this aspect of the Court's holding, believes that the Court 
interpreted section 752(c) too narrowly and has suggested that the fair market value rule in the 
subsection should apply to all "transfers" of property by a partner to a partnership or "transfers" by a 
partnership to a partner. L. Scott Stafford, Section 752(c): The Other Issue In Tufts v. Commis-
sioner, 42 TAx LAw. 93, 119 (1988). The concept of "transfer" embedded in Professor Stafford's 
analysis would extend beyond contributions and distributions of property. It would also extend to 
sales by partners to partnerships or partnerships to partners. Further, transfers between partners and 
partnerships of excess liability property could be viewed as sales under section 707(a)(2)(B) and, if 
such a transfer were viewed as a sale, the purchaser's basis in the acquired property should be 
subject to the fair market value limitation as well. /d. at 114-15. 
90 I.R.C. § 752(d). 
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All of the above sections of Subchapter K have been in the Code since 1954, 
and courts have dealt with these sections in deciding important cases relating to 
the treatment of transactions involving property that was subject to a liability in 
excess of the property's fair market value. Thus, the Supreme Court in Tufts and 
the Tax Court and the Court of. Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Estate of 
Franklin reconciled these sections, particularly sections 752(c) and 752(d). 
Fundamentally, a partner's outside basis will be the determinant of the amount 
he may recover before incurring tax. Upon an event of realization, the outside 
basis and the amount realized will determine ultimate gain or loss for tax pur-
poses. It should be noted here, and will be discussed in detail later,91 that the 
timing and character of that gain may depend greatly on the partnership's activi-
ties and treatment of certain items, and can be affected by transactions with and 
between partners. 
More recently, Congress enacted section 770l(g),92 a subsection contained in 
definitional Chapter 79 of the Code. Section 7701 (g) was intended as a clarify-
ing amendment to the Code and provides as follows: 
(g) Clarification of Fair Market Value in the case of Nonrecourse Indebtedness 
- for purposes of subtitle A, in determining the amount of gain or loss (or 
deemed gain or loss) with respect to any property, the fair market value of such 
property shall be treated as being not less than the amount of any nonrecourse 
. indebtedness to which such property is subject. 
The legislative history surrounding this section sets forth the intended scope and 
limitations of the section and indicates that the section was designed, in part, to 
confirm the Supreme Court's decision in Tufts. 93 It was also intended to govern 
situations in which the fair market value of the property was a determinant of the 
recipient's or distributor's .tax consequences.94 Importantly, however, it was not 
intended to affect the tax treatment of actual sales or acquisitions of property 
subject to liabilities, results governed by Tufts and Estate of Franklin, respec-
tively, not section 752(c).95 It should also be noted that this section was enacted 
several years after the Treasury issued the most significant regulations relating 
to the excess liabilities over value problem under section I 001.96 
The foregoing sections of the Code and regulations thereunder must be inter-
preted consistently, if possible, and in a way that carries out the broad principles 
of the income tax in a manner consistent with its statutory rules. Thus, the 
provisions' must be interpreted so that a taxpayer's full income is taxed and no 
more. In addition, they must be interpreted so that the conduit principles apply 
91 See infra text accompanying notes 131-38. 
92 Act of July 18, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 75(c), 98 Stat. 494,595. 
93 See STAFF OF JOINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., General Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 239 (Joint Comm. Print 1984 ). 
94Jd. 
95Jd. 
96 Reg. § I.IOOI-2(b). See supra text accompanying note 15. 
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to the conducting of a transaction through a partnership, which. is essentially a 
pass-through entity. 
·' 
. ; 
· 2. Allo,cation of Partnership Liabilities Among Partners 
As discussed above, a partnership that incurs a liability in connection with the 
purchase' of property, whether that liability is recourse or nonrecourse, includes 
the amount of the liability in addition to any cash purchase price in the basis of 
the property purchased. The question dealt with by the regulations ·under section 
752 is how· those liabilities are shared· among· the partners. The regulations. 
resolve that issue by referencing to the liability as recourse or nonrecourse, that 
is, determining whether any partner bears the economic responsibility. for the· 
payment of that liability.97 Regardless of how the liability is shared among the 
partners and is, thereby, included in their outside bases, the logic of Subchapter 
K prescribes that the amount of the liability of the partnership must be reflected 
in the outside basis of the partners in a manner so that the aggregate liability 
component in those outside bases equals the amount of the partnership's liabil-
ity. 
Suppose that a partnership purchases property for a nonrecourse indebtedness 
substantially in excess of the value of the property. Under the Estate of Franklin 
doctrine, 98 the partnership's basis in the property could be limited in one.of three 
ways. First, one could contend that the partnership was not the true owner of the 
property and, therefore, had no recognizable basis in the property.99 Second, one 
could contend that even if the partnership is the true owner, it has purchased the 
property for debt that is contingent arid, therefore, not includable in the basis of 
the purchased property .100 Third, one could contend that the partnership, while 
the true owner,. purchased the property for debt that .was contingent in .part; . 
permitting only the noncontingent portion of the debt to be inducted in the 
property's basis. 101 
The partners' respective outside bases would also be affected by the applica-
tion of the Estate of Franklin doctrine. The effect would be consistent with the 
treatment.of the partnership. Under the first and second alternatives, the part" 
ners~ shares of the partnership's liabilities would be zero, because there are no 
liabilities ·in the partnership to share. Under the third alternative, the partners' 
shares of partnership liabilities would be limited, in the aggregate, to the fair 
market value of the partnership's property at the time of purchase. 
Thus, if a partnership purchases property by giving nonrecourse indebtedness 
that substantially exceeds the value of the property, a classic Estate of Franklin 
situation, the basis consequences to the partnership will also be reflected.in the 
outside bases of the partners. For example, if the debt is viewed as wholly 
97 Reg. § 1.752-1. 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.' 
99 See Estate of Franklin, 64 T.C. at 762. 
100 See supra note 25. 
101 See supra note 26. 
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contingent and, therefore, a nullity at the partnership level, the partners will not 
reflect any of the debt in their outside bases. If the debt is respected up to the 
value of the property securing the nonrecourse liability, then the partners will 
share that limited amount of liability among themselves in their outside bases. 102 
Similarly, if the nonrecourse liability that has been viewed as a nullity under 
the Estate of Franklin doctrine at the time the property was acquired is dis-
charged upon foreclosure of the property or transfer of the property subject to 
·that liability, then the deemed distribution to the partners by virtue of the extin-
guishment of the liability should be limited to the amount of.the liability that 
was included in those partners' outside bases. This result ·follows from ·the 
principles of Regulation section l.l 001-2( a)(3). 103 Finally, a similar result should 
obtain if only a portion of. the liability is cancelled by the creditor. For example, 
if the liability is viewed as a nullity when it arose, its cancellation should not 
give rise to cancellation of indebtedness income to the partnership or to any of 
its constituent partners. Thus, the excess of the face amount of a nonrecourse 
liability over the portion, if any, that is respected, if viewed as a nullity to the · 
partnership should also be viewed as a nullity to its constituent partners. 
The satisfaction of, or relief from, that liability that has been treated as contin-
gent or unreal, either by virtue of its assumption in the sale of the property, its 
satisfaction upon foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure, or its forgiveness 
upon cancellation of a portion of the debt, should have no effect on either the 
partnership or its partners. The reason for this result is the paramount impor-
tance of consistent treatment. 
As discussed previously, the Estate of Franklin line of cases did not derive 
from any statutory authority but rather derived from and, indeed, represents an 
application of the judicially created principle referred to as "substance over 
form." Under that concept, even though parties to a transaction would refer to an 
economic relationship as one giving rise to a "liability," no such liability for tax 
purposes would be respected if the substance of the transaction proved other-
wise. If that result obtains with regard to the partnership's tax treatment of the 
purported liability, the same result must flow through to the partners. Con-
versely, if the liability of the partnership is respected at the time of acquisition, it 
should be respected with regard to the partners subsequently, even if the prop-
erty declines in value below the amount of the debt. 
Ultimately, the determination of whether a liability is respected should de-
pend upon whether the obligor under the liability has a true obligation to pay. 
That determination, then, must be made at the partnership level. In that sense, 
the treatment of the liability as either a liability or a sham is an entity question in 
the same manner that taxable income and realization are determined at the 
partnership level as if the partnership were an entity, and in the same manner in 
which ownership of property is viewed as ownership by an entity. 
1112 See Regents Park Partners v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3131, 1992 T.C.M. (RIA) 'll 
92,336. 
103 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
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3. The Entry of a New Partner 
Suppose a partnership that originally purchased property at its fair market 
value experiences a decline in value of that property so as to cause the value of 
the property to be substantially below the amount of the nonrecourse liability 
secured by the property. At that point, suppose a new partner ("Newpartner") 
either purchases another partner's interest or enters the partnership through a 
contribution to the partnership's capital. · · 
This situation can be illustrated by reference to the example dealt with earlier 
in this Article. 104 In that example, the taxpayer (assume a partnership) purchased 
property for $10,000,000, paying $1,000,000 in cash and issuing a nonrecourse 
promissory note for the balance in the amount of $9,000,000, 'bearing adequate 
interest. When the value of the property declined to $5,000,000, Newpartner 
purchased a ten percent interest in the partnership from Oldpartner for nominal 
consideration (assume zero). As a result of the transaction, Oldpartner's amount 
realized equals his share of the partnership's liabilities, amounting to ten percent 
of $9,000,000 or $900,000. Assuming that the basis of the property in the hands 
of the partnership is equal to its value105 and that Oldpartner was an original 
partner, Oldpartner's outside basis in his partnership interest would be $500,000, 106 
causing his sale to Newpartner to generate gain in the amount of $400,000. 
The treatment of Newpartner as a result of the transaction, however, is more 
complicated and subject to disagreement. A recent article by Claire Toth107 ex-
amines the tax consequences to a Newpartner who purchases an interest in an 
"excess liability partnership," i.e., a partnership that owns property which has a 
fair market value and basis substantially Jess than the outstanding balance of the 
nonrecourse indebtedness that is secured by the property. Toth expresses the 
view that recent case law would limit the purchaser's basis in the partnership 
interest to the purchaser's share, however that share is determined, of the 
property's fair market value at the time of purchase ofthe partnership interest. 108 
This view, she contends, I would suggest, mistakenly, is supported by the Re-
gents Park case, 109 which in tum relied upon Estate of Franklin. 110 Thus, under 
104 See supra text accompanying note 61. 
10~ This assumption is made only for convenience. 
106 lt is also assumed that the partnership has had no transactions with partners that would affect its 
inside basis. 
107 Toth, supra note 3, at 42. 
108 /d. at 40. · 
109 Regents Park Partners, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3132, 3131-17, 1992 T.C.M. (RIA) '1!92,336 at 
1743. Regents Park involved the acquisition of property by a partnership for no consideration other 
than taking the property subject to an existing nonrecourse note that exceeded the fair market value 
of the property. The court held that the partnership was entitled to a basis in the property equal to its 
fair market value and that the indebtedness in excess of that amount should be treated as a contingent 
liability and not as an addition to basis. The court then determined that the partners' outside bases 
must exclude that excess amount as well. Importantly, however, the court first limited the partnership's 
liability for tax purposes to the fair market value of the property, so that limiting the partners' 
outside basis with regard to the liability to the value of the property was consistent with, and indeed 
followed from, its principal holding. In this connection, the court noted that "a partner's share of 
partnership liabilities is a partnership item. Sec. 301.6263(a)(3)-l(a)(l)(v), Proceed. & Admin. Regs." 
ld. at 3132 n.26. Further, the court determined the partners' outside basis by virtue of section 752(c) 
and 752(a), without mention of section 752(d). ld. 
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this view it appears that the purchaser of the partnership interest, presumably for 
no consideration, has a basis that is less than her share of partnership liabilities, 
because, as to Newpartner, a portion of the partnership's liability is viewed as 
lacking substance or as contingent. 
Under Toth's view of existing law, Newpartner's outside basis would be 
$500,000, consisting of the portion of the nonrecourse indebtedness not exceed-
ing the value of the property, which is allocable to Newpartner's ten percent 
interest in the partnership. 111 Unlike other partners who are free from the Estate 
of Franklin taint, because they acquired their partnership interests before the 
property's value fell below the amount of the nonrecourse debt, Newpartner is 
subject to it in order to prevent the inflated basis abuse. As a result, a liability 
that is recognized as a true liability inside the partnership loses that character for 
purposes of determining outside bases-but not as to all of the partners' outside 
bases-only Newpartner's outside basis. 
If the partnership were to then dispose of its property, for example, through 
foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure, then the partnership would have an 
amount realized equal to the balance of the nonrecourse indebtedness and gain 
determined in that manner. Newpartner would be credited with her distributive 
share of that gain, which would also increase Newpartner's outside basis. Elimi-
nation of the liability, however, would correspondingly decrease Newpartner's 
outside basis as if it were a distribution of cash. 112 Thus, under this analysis, 
although Newpartner would not treat all of the partnership's liability as a real 
liability upon purchase of the partnership interest, Newpartner would be required 
to treat the entire liability as a true liability when relieved of it. 
Returning to our example, a foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure would 
cause the partnership to have an amount realized equal to $9,000,000, the out-
standing balance of the nonrecourse indebtedness. Because the partnership's 
inside basis in the property is $5,000,000, the partnership would realize a 
$4,000,000 gain. Ten percent of that gain or $400,000 would be allocated to 
Newpartner as a ten percent partner. 113 Further, under Toth' s analysis, Newpartner 
would experience a deemed distribution under section 752(b) in the amount of 
$900,000, ten percent of the partnership's nonrecourse liability. This distribution 
on these facts would be offset by Newpartner's increased basis in the amount of 
$400,000 by virtue of being allocated a portion of the partnership's gain on the 
foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure and, in part, by Newpartner' s outside 
basis attributable to a portion of the partnership's liability under the Estate of 
110 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), affg 64 T.C. 752 (1975). 
111 Under the alternative view of Estate of Franklin, pursuant to which the nonrecourse indebted-
ness is viewed as wholly contingent, Newpartner would have no outside basis in the partnership 
interest. 
112 See Toth, supra note 3, at 46-47. 
113 This would also be consistent with the allocation of minimum gain required under the section 
704(b) regulations, pursuant to which Newpartner would step into Oldpartner's shoes. See Reg. 
§ 1.704-2(b)(l ), -2(b)(2). 
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Franklin dbctrine, namely $500,000. Thus, under this analysis, the partnership's 
sale of the property would result in' $400,000 Of taxable gain but no economic 
gain to Newpartner. 
Moreover, if the inore aggressive view of Estate of Franklin were adopted, so 
tha:t Newpartner received no outside basis by virtue of the partnership's 
nonrecourse liability substantially exceeding the value of the partnership's prop-
erty, then the foreclosure of the property would result in $400,000 of taxable 
gain to Newpartner, equal to her distributive share of the partnership's $4,000,000 
of gain. In addition, Newpartner would realize additional gain of $500,000 under 
section 731. This additiomil gain would arise by virtue of Newpartner' s receiv-
ing a deemed distribution in the amount of $900,000 (resulting from Newpartner' s 
ten percent share of the elimination of the partnership's liability of $9,000,000), 
which amount exceeded Newpartner's $400,000 outside basis. Newpartner's 
outside basis was only $400,000, because prior to the sale Newpartner was 
precluded from including any of the partnership's nonrecourse indebtedness in 
her outside basis. As a result, the deemed distribution would be offset by only 
the $400,000 increased basis attributable tci Newpartner's distributive share of 
partnership gain. Accordingly, the net result of the transaction, under the forego-
ing extension of Toth's analysis, 'should the more aggressive view of Estate of 
Franklin apply at the partner level, would be taxable gain in the amount of 
$900,000, but no economic gain to Newpartner. 
Similarly, if a portion of the partnership's nonrecourse debt is cancelled, the 
partners, including Newpartner, would be allocated their respective distributive 
shares of that separately stated item. 114 For example, if $4;000,000 of the out-
standing $9,000,000 of nonrecourse indebtedness were cancelled by the lender, 
Newpartner's distributive share of that cancellation of indebtedness income would 
be $400,000. That amount would be includable in Newpartner's income as ordi-
nary income and would increase her outside basis. In addition, Newpartner 
would have a deemed distribution by virtue of the reduction in the partnership's 
liabilities in the amount of $400,000, under Toth's view of existing law, yielding 
no additional gain to Newpartner, but reducing her outside basis by the amount 
of the distribution. The net result. of the debt cancellation to Newpartner, then, 
would be income of $400,000 without outside basis credit of that amount. But, if 
Newpartner's portion of the liability was never respected and was viewed as a 
nullity, how could its cancellation generate income to Newpartner, as Toth sug-
gests would occur under current law absent legislative change? For there to be 
cancellation indebtedness income outside the partnership context, there must be 
a .debt that has been cancelled. If a taxpayer has no obligation to repay a debt, 
then its discharge without payment by the taxpayer cannot result in cancellation 
114 See Gershkowitz v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 984 ( 1987} (holding that cancellation of a nonrecourse 
debt gives rise to cancellation of indebtedness income}. 
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of indebtedness income.~ 15 Con~istency. would·. require .!1 similar resultwitlne-
gard to a,partner's share pf a partnership li~bility,that is not ;espected., Ac.cord-
ingly, under a proper interpretation of Subchapter K, a partnership liability that 
is. not respected with respect to a, particular partner shoul~ no~ giye rise to 
cancellation of indebtedness income to that partner \Yhen forgiven at the partner-
ship level. , . , .. 
These iiwqnsistencies would, ca~,~se Newpartner to have ·taxable. income or 
gain by reason of ow.nership of the partnersh.ip i~terest in the absence 9f eco-
nomic gain. This is a~ unusual pheno,menon found only in penalty, or ,"public 
policy" provision~ .of the Code. The structure. of the Code causes tax· gain. ulti- . 
mately ~o c<;mform to economic gain,. although its timing may diverge and its 
character may be treated preferentially. Yet, itis the assertion that inconsisten-
cies between tax gain a~d economic gain can exist and, indeed, are mandated by 
the interplay of the current provisions of Subchapter K with Tufts and Estate of 
Franklin that are at the heart of Toth's analysis. All other consequences and 
disadvantages to Newpartner e~umerated and disc~ssed by Toth,, other than 
disadvantages relating to timing of income a~d character of incom,.e .(ordinary or 
capital), flow frqm this interpretation qf the interaction of the statutory rules of 
sections 1001 and 752 and the equitable and "tax logic" principals of Tufts and 
Estate of Franklin. 116. 
. ' 
115 Millar v, Commissioner •. 540 F.2d 184, 18q. (3rd Cir. 1976). Further, when the taxpayer has 
executed promissory notes but those notes do not pose a true liability on the taxpayer, the cancella-
tion of those notes do not result in cancellation .of indebtedness ·income. See a/so De Voe v. 
Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 641,648, 1986 T.C.M. (RIA) 'l[ 86,477, at 2177. In DeVoe, the 
taxpayer execut~d nonrecourse promissory notes in connection with the acquisition of license to sell 
certain medical equipment. The notes called for payments to be made based upon the number of 
units of the equipment sold in the taxpayer's sales territory. The Court held that the notes did not 
have substance and, therefore, would not be respected. It followed, then, that their cancellation could . 
not result in c.ancellation of indebtedness income. . . . , 
·
116 An inconsistent treatment of partnership liabilities betwee_n the partnership and its partners 
could lead to other anomalous results. ·For example, if the partnetShip had excess liability property at 
the time Newpartner purchases a partnership interest, under the theory of the Tax Court's opinion in 
Estate of Franklin, Newpartner would not be regar<)ed as owning a partnersh,ip interest in a partner-
ship that owns the property. Yet, the partnership is entitled to depreciation on the property. Where· 
does Newpartner's share of that depreciation go? If New partner were not a partner for tax purposes 
and Oldpartner ceased to be a partner, presumably depreciation deductions would be allocated· to the 
oth.er partners. 
It would also follow that when the property is 'sold, there is no signi.ficant event that occurs with. 
respect to Newpartner, because as to her, the partnership never owned the property. Where does the 
theoretical distributive share of the gain go? Surely neither the depreciation nor eventual gain would 
be allocated to Oldpartner, from whom Newpartner purchased her interest. Oldpartner has severed 
her ties to the partnership. Certainly they should not be allocated among the continuing partners, 
who were strangers to Newpartner' s transaction with Oldpartner. 
Alternatively, if Newpartner were regarded as il partner with no outside basis by virtue of the 
partnership's liability, under the more conventional view of the court of appeals in Estate of Franklin, 
presumably, .depreciation could be allocated to her but suspended under .section 704(d) because of 
her lack of outside basis. 
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Toth asserts that these anomalous 'results, ·which she regards as· unfair and 
inappropriate, stem from the "discontinuities between inside arid outside basis" 
embedded in Subchapter K and that' the correction of these·anomalous results 
"would almost certainly require legislative changes." 117 They result, in her view, 
because section 752(d), entitled "Sale' or Exchange of an Interest," 118 prescribes 
not only the treatment of the liability to the selling partner, but also the treatment 
to the purchasing partner. The title and express words of the subsection, how-
ever, refer to sale or exchange of a 'partnership interest and appear to focus on 
the seller's treatment. The purchasing partner's treatment of partn~rship liabili-
ties, on the other hand, would appear to be govem~d by subsections (a) and (b) 
of.section 752. Regulation section 1.752-l(h), which explains section 752(d), 
also focuses on the treatment of the selling partner imd the resultant reduction in 
that partner's share· of partnership liabilities. The ·regulation c'oncludes that the 
reduction i's treated as an amount realized under section 100 l: Consistent with 
the above i'nterpret~tion of the subsections, the regulation IS compl,etely silent as 
to the purchaser's treatment. · · · ' · 
The anom.alous results can only be· avoided if th~ new partner 'and the partner-
ship treat at least Newpartner's proportionate sh~e or' the liability consistently. 119 
This congruity. can be accomplished in two ways: under an entity approach or 
under an aggregate approach. 
Under an entity approach, Newpartner's treatment of both partnership owner-
ship and partnership liability can be repoited' as deriving exclusively from the 
partnership's treatment. Thus, a partner who purchase~ a partnership interest in a 
partnership which, at the time of the partner's purchase, owns propeity with a 
value substanti.ally less than the nonrecourse indebtedness secured by it, should 
nevertheless take a basis in the partnership interest equal to the amount paid, if 
any' plus the partner's share of partnership liabilities, determined under the 
regulations under section 752. The Estate of Franklin substance over form doc-
trine should have no application at the partner level b.ecau~e it should be an 
entity-l<!vel doctrine. · 
To illustrate the entity approach, consider it in terms ~f ·the foregoing ex-
ample. Newpartner's share of the partnership's gain ·upon for~closure. would 
depend upon whether the partnership had·made a section 754 election and on the 
consequences of that e)ection. 120 But, in all events, Newpartner' s net tax gain 
and loss would be <:;onsistent with Newpartner's economic ·gain or loss. A fore-
. . . . . . . •. 
1
" Tcith, supra note 3, at 57. . 
118 Section 752(d) provides that in the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, 
liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange of 
property not associated with partnerships. 
119 As noted by the Tax Court in Regents Park Partners, under Regulation section 301.6231(a)(3)-
l (a)( I )(v), a partner's share of partnership liabilities is a partnership item. Regents Park Parnters, 63 
T.C.M. (CCH) at 3132 n.26, 1992 T.C.M. (RIA) 'II 92,336 at 1745. As such, controversy concerning 
it would be resolved in a partnership level proceeding. 
120These issues are discussed in detail later in the Article. 
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closure resulting in $400,000 of gain to Newpartner as the distributive share of 
partnership gain would increase Newpartner's basis by that amount. If Newpartner 
failed to receive a like amount in liquidation of the partnership interest, it would 
result in an offsetting loss to Newpartner in that same amount upon liquidation 
of the partnership interest, in which Newpartner would have a basis of $400,000. · 
Alternatively, if the partnership's section 754 election resulted in a section 743(b) 
special inside basis adjustment to her allocable to the property in the amount of 
$400,000, the foreclosure would not result in any gain to her. In that event, 
Newpartner's involvement in the transaction would have resulted in neither 
taxable nor economic gain or loss. Thus, the treatment that would obtain apply-
ing the Estate of Franklin doctrine purely at the partnership level maintains the 
basic consistency of treatment between partner and partnership. This view will 
be referred to as the entity-level application of Estate of Franklin. 
Under an aggregate approach, consistency can also be maintained by applying 
the Estate of Franklin doctrine to Newpartner at both the partner level and the 
partnership level. Application of an aggregate theory could be supported by 
reference to the partnership anti-abuse rules of Regulation section 1.701-2, un-
der which the Service, with high-level review, is granted the authority to 
recharacterize partnership transactions to assure a result consistent with the in-
tent of Subchapter K. Subchapter K is designed to tax partnership operations 
directly to its partners under a conduit principle. 121 It should not create ultimate 
taxable income when none would exist if the operations were conducted by an 
individual. Thus, it is possible that the anti-abuse regulations would support the 
treatment of Newpartner as a direct owner of a portion of the property, subject to 
a pro rata portion of the liability. 122 
Under application of an aggregate theory, Newpartner, upon purchasing the 
partnership interest in the previous example, would obtain an outside basis by 
virtue of the partnership's liability of (presumably) $500,000, computed as ten 
percent of that portion of the partnership's nonrecourse indebtedness that does 
not exceed the value of the property. Upon Newpartner's purchase, the partner-
ship in its internal tax accounting for the liability would reduce the liability by 
the portion ·of the liability that has been disregarded, that is $400,000. As a 
result, the partnership's liability for tax purposes would be $8,600,000 ($9,000,000 
less $400,000, the disregarded portion of the liability attributable to Newpartner' s 
purchase of the partnership interest). Of that amount, Newpartner would be 
allocated $500,000 ($900,000 less the disregarded portion of $400,000). The 
historic partners would be unaffected by Newpartner's entry into the partnership 
121 See I.R.C. § 701; I WILLIAMS. McKEE ET AL., fEDER.AL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 
'lli.OI[I] (3ded. 1997). 
122 Reg.§ 1.701-2(b)(l). But see Regulation section 1.701-Z(e), which may be viewed as carving 
out from potential aggregate treatment transactions where entity treatment is prescribed and contem-
plated by the Code or regulations. 
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and the application of the f,state of Franklin doctrine to Newpartner. Their share 
of the partnership liability would remain $8,100,000 (ninety percent of 
$9,000,000). 
. 
. Upon foreclosure of the property, the partnership would realize gai,n in the 
amount of. $3,600,000, computed.as,follows: the amount realized equal to the 
nonrecourse in~ebtedness that has been satisfied by the transfer .($8,600,000) 
less the partnership's insid~ basis in the property ($5,000,000). Of that am~mnt, 
~ne historic partners would be allocated gain equal to their aggregate minimum 
gain ($9,000,000 - $5,000,000 = $4,000,000; $4,000,000 x .90 ;= $3,600,000.) 
Newpartner's share of the gain would be computed as follows: amount realized 
of $500,000, representing the respected portion of the nonrecours~ liability as to 
Newpartner, less Newpartner's outside basis, $500,000 = 0. Under this approach, 
Newpartner' s taxable gain, zero, conforms to Newpartner' s economic gain, also 
zero.· 
Although this aggregate approach permits a consistent treatment at the partner 
and partnership level,accomplishing this approach with or without a section 754 
election in force and under the mechanics of partnership accounting is compli-
cated and problematic at best. It requires, among other adjustments, a reduction 
of the partnership's and Newpartner's minimum gain without any chargeback. 
In any event, the illogical or inconsistent result that Toth suggests obtains 
under current ta~ law should not obtain. Indeed, this result is precluded by 
overriding principles of the tax law, in general, and Subchapter K specifically, 
which dictate the interpretation of individual tax provisions. The statutory and 
common law principles t~at are applicable to the entry of Newpartner into the 
excess liability partnership are best interpreted and, indeed, can be easily inter-
preted without contorting the statute to accomplish the consistent result by refe(-
ence to. both the wording and the legislative intent of the relevant provisions. 
Moreover, the logic of Subchapter K requires that int~rpretation, 
. Professor Ernest Brown, in The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 123 
explains the rationale of this analysis succinctly. In concluding that a taxpayer 
who received an automobile valued at $5000 as a bonus from his employer or as 
a lottery prize, obtained a basis of $5000 in the automobile, he states: "we 
should, I am sure, stretch the word cost almost out of recognizable shape to 
mean the amount at which the car was taken into income, and we should feel 
justified in doing so in order to give the statute the quality of rationality.'' 124 
123 Ernest Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 So. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1961). 
124 /d. at 239-40. The tax benefit rule, now partially codified in section Ill, also provides a rule to 
accomplish a fair and rational result. Specifically, the tax benefit rule provides, in the exclusionary 
context, that when a previously deducted item is recovered subsequently, the recovery does not 
produce taxable income in the year .of the recovery if the prior deduction produced no "tax benefit." 
The tax benefit ruie was originally developed by the courts to prevent tax injustice resulting from the 
annual a~counting period concept and1 tJ:!ereby, to accomplish a more accurate measurement of 
income. See Hillsboro Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1982); United States v. Bliss 
Dairy, Inc., 460 U.S. 370, 374 n.2 (1983). See also Rowland W. Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and 
Related Problems, 20 TAXES 473 ( 1942), for an historical perspective. 
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The internal consistency of the Code is nowhere better exemplified than by 
the seminal case of Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States. 125 In 
Philadelphia Park, the court was asked to determine the basis of property re-
ceived in a taxable exchange for other property. The basis of the received prop-
erty was important because the taxpayer abandoned that property · iri a· subse-
quent year and sought a loss deduction for the abandonment. Notwithstanding 
that basis is defined as "cost," the court held that the basis of property received 
in a taxable transaction is equal to its fair market value and not the fair market 
value of the property given in the transaction if that latter value differs from the 
value of the property received. 
At first glance, this conclusion is counterintuitive; cost normally means what 
is given to acquire a property. However, because basis in the tax law provides 
the unifying function of determining and keeping track of the amount that a 
taxpayer may receive upon disposing of a property without incurring tax, that is, 
a measure of recovery of capital, its determination must be made with a view 
towards accomplishing that function. Any other rule that would fail to give the 
taxpayer basis credit for the amount already included in income with respect to 
the property would risk taxing that amount twice, an unfair result. It is virtually 
universally acknowledged in the tax law, as a result, that basis must be deter-
mined in order to avoid that result. This same rationale supports a basis of 
property received as compensation in kind equal to its fair market value when 
received. This figure is the amount with respect to the property that was in-
cluded in the taxpayer's income as compensation which the taxpayer shotdd be 
allowed to recover without incurring further tax. 
Tax logic, then, requires that "basis," a term of art in the tax law, should be 
interpreted with the ultimate goal of ensuring that a taxpayer's economic gain 
should be accounted for as gain subject to tax, but that no more than the taxpayer's 
economic gain should be subject to tax. This rule of tax logic, of course, could 
be modified by a specific congressional provision altering it. However, absent 
specific provisions in the Code that would either forgive tax 126 or further a 
specific public policy by taxing a taxpayer on more than the taxpayer's eco-
nomic gain, 127 the rule of tax logic should obtain. 
Another example of a judicial decision accomplishing rationality for the tax law is Arrowsmith v. 
Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952). In that case, a stockholder who paid off obligations of a liquidated 
corporation suffered a capital, not an ordinary, loss even though the payment was not in itself a sale 
or exchange of a capital asset. See Brown, supra note 123, at 236-37. 
125 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
126 E.g., section 1014, which allows the beneficiary of a decedent to inherit property with a basis 
equal to the property's fair market value (or alternate valuation date value), even though the dece-
dent was never subject to tax on the appreciation that occurred during his or her life. 
127 E.g., section 162(c), which denies a deduction for illegal payments and kickbacks, even though 
such payments are made in connection with the earning of income, and section 67(b), subjecting 
"miscellaneous itemized deductions" to a two percent floor so that those expenses, which are in-
curred to earn income, are only allowed to reduce taxable income to the extent they exceed two 
percent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 
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The Supreme Court's analysis and result in Tufts are consistent with this tax 
logic and, indeed, are grounded in it. The regulations' treatment of liabilities that 
are excluded from basis when excess liability property is purchased and the 
exclusion of those liabilities fl;om amount realized when such property is sold 
represents another example of adherence to tax logic. 128 Failure to follow a 
consistent treatment of a liability in dealing with excess liability property simply 
because the taxpayer's involvement is in the context of Subchapter K would 
violate that tax logic and would deprive the tax system of its quality of rational-
ity. Inconsistent treatment should require explicit statutory authority. There is no 
such explicit provision or stated legislative intent to justify any inconsistency 
here, however. To the contrary, the Tufts case emphasizes the overriding impor-
tance of treating liabilities consistently in order to accomplish a rational result. 
A possible objection to this analysis may arise because of the potential benefit 
available to Newpartner, who likely could obtain the tax shelter benefit of the 
partnership in the same manner as if he were a partner in a partnership that had 
newly purchased the property by means of a nonrecourse indebtedness in excess 
of the value of the property. Such a new entrant would then become entitled to 
the timing and character benefits available to tax shelter participants, which 
were discussed at the outset of this Article. 
These benefits, however, are not likely to be as great or as useful as the 
benefits available during the zenith of tax shelters. Recovery periods are longer 
now, and the timing advantage would be subject to the passive activity loss rules 
of section 469, if applicable. Further, as the analysis that follows will demon-
strate, the timing tax benefits that Newpartner could derive would be no greater 
than would be derived by the original partner who was entitled to them had he 
not sold to Newpartner. Moreover, Newpartner would be subject to the same tax 
detriments as would the selling partner have been had the selling partner not 
sold his partnership interest. Thus, any potential abuse by Newpartner would 
derive from the trade-off of future ordinary income tax deductions during the 
recovery period of the partnership's property (subject to the timing limitations 
under the passive activity loss rules) for capital gain treatment in that same 
amount at the time of disposition of the partnership interest (or sale or foreclo-
sure of the property in the partnership). 
From an overall tax revenue perspective, these benefits would be offset by the 
tax detriment to the seller. Capital gain would be recognized by Oldpartner at 
the time of sale of her partnership interest to Newpartner. Any resulting aggre-
gate net benefit to the two as a result of the transaction would depend upon the 
trade-off of timing benefits and preferential rates. In any event, they are likely to 
be substantially less than the benefits available in the archetypical Estate of 
Franklin situation, in which the tax benefits to the purchaser were not likely to 
be offset by any immediate detriment to the seller, who would likely report the 
transaction uqder the installment method, thereby, deferring gain. 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. 
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Any potential abuse, however, theoretically can be eliminated without creat-
ing incongruity between a partner and partnership. This elimination can be ac-
complished by adopting the aggregate approach application of the Estate of 
Franklin doctrine. As discussed earlier, however, it is mechanically problematic 
and lacks support both under current case law (of which there is none) or case 
law in analogous situations when a section 754 election has not been made. 129 
Moreover, section 7701 (g) in the partnership context, discussed more fully in 
the material that follows, lends support to favoring an entity approach. 
If an aggregate approach is either unsupportable or impractical, the potential 
for timing and character benefits could remain. But, the elimination of these 
potential benefits does not lie in rejecting the requirement of consistent treat-
ment of partnership liabilities, which, as I have argued, are based on the conduit 
principles of Subchapter K and the rationality of the tax law. Rather, other 
corrections to timing imperfections should be explored, if the passive activity. 
loss rules prove insufficient and the potential is considered sufficiently abusive. 
Accordingly, the remaining portion of this Article will focus on and support the 
entity theory for the application of the Estate of Franklin doctrine. 
4. Timing Considerations 
a. Section 754 Election and Section 743(b) Adjustment. It is likely that 
Newpartner, who purchased her partnership interest from Oldpartner, would 
obtain a timing advantage if the partnership had a section 754 election in effect. 
Such an election would make Newpartner eligible for a special basis with regard 
to any partnership property that had a fair market value at the time Newpartner 
purchased her partnership interest that exceeded its inside basis. 130 The basis 
adjustment would be limited to Newpartner's proportionate share of the appre-
ciationY1 
In general, the allocation of the special basis adjustment with respect to 
Newpartner among the properties of the partnership is governed by section 755. 
Under that section, partnership assets are grouped between (l) ordinary income 
assets and (2) capital assets and section 1231 property. Net appreciation attribut-
129 There is one case in which a U.S. District Court imputed its own section 743(b) adjustment to 
the inside basis of a purchasing partner in the absence of a partnership section 754 election in order 
to accomplish "equity" for the partner. See Barnes v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Ill. 
1966.) This case, however, is widely regarded as anomalous and inconsistent with the statute. See 2 
WILUAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS '1!24.04[3] n.73 (3d ed. 
1997); STEPHEN LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 271 n.2 
(1994). See also Rev. Rul. 89-108, 1989-2 C.B. 100 (applying a quasi-aggregate approach to an 
installment sale by a partnership whose assets consisted in part of inventory); Toth, supra note 3, at 
58-60 (discussing other authorities). Indeed, Toth identified this approach as a possible administra-
tive way out of the dilemma, but denied the likelihood that such an approach would be adopted, 
because the purchasing partner could not resort to "outside policy on which to base his claim for 
relief." Toth, supra note 3, at 58. The foregoing discussion in the text of Philadelphia Park and Tufts 
may supply the requisite policy basis. 
130 I.R.C. §§ 743(b), 755. 
131 I.R.C. § 755. 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 51, No. I 
HeinOnline -- 51 Tax Law. 78 1997-1998
78 SECTION OFT AXA TION 
able to each group is then allocated among the appreciated assets in each respec-
tive group. 132 Assume that the only tangible asset of the partnership is the 
partnership's excess liability property. Arguably, under section 755 and the regu-
lations under that section, Newpartner's special basis adjustment would cause 
the inside basis in the property to be no greater than her share of the property's 
value. Thus, it is possible that the adjustment may leave Newpartner's inside 
basis at exactly the amount of the common basis, with no appropriate adjust-
ment. Such a result would ameliorate any abuse potential that might otherwise 
be available for Newpartner, who purchased a partnership interest in a partner-
ship that had excess liability property. 
Regulation section 1.755-2T coordinates section 755 with section 1060, a 
section in the Code that requires the selling partner and purchasing partner to 
allocate the purchase price, which includes the nonrecourse indebtedness, among 
the partnership's properties, in order to ensure consistent treatment of the trans-
action. That regulation provides for the allocation, under appropriate circum-
stances, of a portion of the purchase price to goodwill or going concern value, 
under a method referred to as the "residual method." Under the residual method, 
after the partner's special basis adjustment or any part thereof is allocated to the 
partnership's assets to bring the partner's inside basis up to her proportionate 
share of the value of those assets, the remaining amount will be allocated to 
goodwill or going concern value. 133 
Suppose, that the actual unencumbered value of the excess liability property is 
less than the purchase price deemed paid by Newpartner, namely, her share of 
the nonrecourse liability. A portion of the special basis adjustment equal to the 
excess of Newpartner's proportionate share of the actual value of the property 
over her proportionate share of the common basis in the property, if there is an 
132 Such an allocation method could yield a result different from allocating special basis among the 
assets so as to cause Newpartner' s inside basis (including common basis and special adjustment) to 
be equal to New partner's share of the asset's value. 
133 First, the fair market value of each item of partnership property (other than property in the 
nature of goodwill or going concern value) shall be determined on the basis of all the facts and 
circumstances. Reg. § 1.755-2T(b)(l). Then, the fair market value of partnership property in the 
nature of goodwill or going concern value (referred to in this section as goodwill) shall be deemed to 
equal the amount (not below zero) which if assigned to such property would result in a liquidating 
distribution to the transferee partner equal to such partner's basis for the transferred partnership 
interest immediately after the transfer (reduced by the amount, if any, of such basis that is attribut-
able to partnership liabilities) if-
(i) all partnership property were sold immediately after such transfer for an amount equal 
to the fair market value of such property (as determined under this section), ahd 
(ii) the proceeds of that sale were, after the payment of all partnership liabilities (within 
the meaning of section 752 and the regulations thereunder), distributed to the partners. 
Reg. § 1.755-2T(b)(2). 
As McKee points out, the regulations under section I 060 take the position that the residual 
method of valuing goodwill for purposes of section 755 applies to basis adjustments under section 
743(b) if assets of the partnership constitute a trade or business for purposes of section 1060(c). See 
McKEE, supra note 129, at 'l[ 24.04[4]; Temp. Reg.§ 1.1060-2T(a)(2). 
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excess, would constitute. a special basis adjustment with regard to the property. 
The .remaining amount of any available basis adjustment would then be allo-
cated to goodwill. Note that goodwill is now depreciable over fifteen years. 134 
Temporary Regulation section 1.755-2T(e) provides an example of the appli-
cation of the residual method. Adapting this example, if Newpartner purchased 
for a nominal amount a ten percent interest in a partnership that owned property 
with a value and basis of$5,000,000, and subject to a liability of $9,000,000, the 
partnership's goodwjll would be valued at $4,000,000 and Newpartner would be 
entitled to a special basis adjustment of $400,000, allocable to the goodwill. 
The application of section 770l(g) to this example would yield a different, 
more sensible and potentially less abusive result. Section 7701 (g) would require 
the value of the property to be regarded as no less than the nonrecourse indebt-
edness secured by the property. That is because the hypothetical sale of the 
property could be for no less than $9,000,000. As a result, by valuing the 
property at $9,000,000, no amount would be allocated to Newpartner's share of 
goodwill. Rather, Newpartner's entire special basis adjustment of $400,000 (as-
suming that the partnership's property has a common basis of $5,000,000) would 
be allocated to the property. 
Thus, it is likely that section 770l(g), which, in short, provides that the fair 
market value of property is to be treated as being not less than the amount of any 
nonrecourse indebtedness to which its property is subject, would govern the 
allocation of the special basis adjustment. This rule is reasonable because, under 
all situations, the sale or other disposition of the property would relieve the 
partnership of its obligation under the nonrecourse indebtedness. The amount.of 
the nonrecourse indebtedness, in effect, puts a lower limit on the value of the 
property as far as the partnership is concerned. Its application would support a 
special basis adjustment beyond the actual fair market value of the property and 
up to the amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness. Such a special basis adjust-
ment could yield depreciation deductions to Newpartner in an amount greater 
than the amount that was available to Oldpartner, whose depreciation deductions 
would generally be governed by the partnership's common basis. 
The extra depreciation deductions in the aggregate, however, would be no 
greater than the gain already realized by Oldpartner upon his sale of his partner-
ship interest, although the character of Newpartner' s deductions would offset 
ordinary income instead of the capital gain that Oldpartner likely realized. Fur-
ther, the installment sale rules would not serve to postpone Oldpartner's gain 
because Oldpartner's share of the partnership's·liabilities would be includable in 
amount realized in the year of disposition. 135 
134 l.R.C. § 197. 
135 I.R.C. § 752(d). See section 453(b)(l) (defining "installment sale" for purposes of qualifying 
the sale for the installment method under section 453(a) and requiring at least one payment to be 
received after the close of the taxable year of the sale). See also Reg.§ 15A.453-I(b)(3) (including 
in the computation of payment received in the taxable yealj the amount of qualifying indebtedness 
assumed or taken subject to the extent such indebtedness exceeds the seller's basis in the property); 
Reg. §§ 15A.453-I(b)(2)(iii) and -l(b)(2)(v) (defining "Contract Price" and "Gross Profit" and 
assuring that the excess will be includable as gain in the year of disposition). 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 51, No. I 
HeinOnline -- 51 Tax Law. 80 1997-1998
80 SECTION OF TAXATION 
It should be noted that any benefit derived by Newpartner by virtue of section 
7701 (g) under this interpretation would be in the nature of a timing and charac-
ter benefit. Specifically, Newpartner's benefit is a matter of timing and poten-
tially character because deductions resulting from a special inside basis adjust-
ment would reduce Newpartner's outside basis and, therefore, increase any po-
tential gain. Recall that adjustments inside the partnership affect timing and 
character. Absolute gain or loss is determined by outside basis. 
b. Revaluations of Property. Suppose Newpartner enters the partnership as a 
ten percent partner (with a ten percent interest in profits, losses, and distribu-
tions) by making a small capital contribution to the partnership at a time when 
the partnership's property has a basis and value of $5,000,000, subject to a 
nonrecourse liability of $9,000,000. The entry of Newpartner permits a revalua-
tion of partnership property 136 and, through application of the principles of sec-
tion 704(c), causes a shift in the allocation of depreciation deductions to 
Newpartner, to the possible disadvantage of the existing partners, as described 
below. 
In general, the regulations dealing with "revaluations of property" prescribe 
that upon the occurrence of an appropriate event, capital accounts must be 
adjusted and that compliance with the regulation requires that the adjustments 
are based on fair market value of partnership property (taking section 770 l (g) 
into account) on the date of adjustment. 137 Thus, revaluations of property or 
"book-ups" deem the fair market value of excess liability property to be not less 
than the amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness. A revaluation of partnership 
property is appropriate in situations when a new partner enters the partnership or 
a distribution is made by the partnership to a partner. It is not appropriate when 
one partner simply purchases the interest of another partner, even if a section 
754 election is in effect for the partnership. 
Regulation section l.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(g) allocates depreciation deductions to 
Newpartner based upon the new book value of the revalued property of the 
partnership. Thus, Newpartner would be allocated l/10 of the depreciation com-
puted on a basis of $9,000,000 (subject to the ceiling rule), with the original 
continuing partners being entitled to the remaining depreciation. Thus, under the 
regulations issued under section 704(c), a revaluation could affect the allocation 
of depreciation deductions between a new entering partner and the continuing 
partners. Any deductions allocated to Newpartner reduce the deductions allo-
cated to the other partners. This result would follow, regardless of whether 
Newpartner was permitted to include any of the partnership's liability in outside 
"'
6 Reg.§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(!). The example in the text assumes that Newpartner's deemed contri-
bution under section 752(a) is regarded as more than de minimis and principally for a substantial 
non-tax business purpose. 
137 Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(!)(l ). While the enactment of section 7701(g) post-dates the inside 
basis provisions of sections 734(b) and 743(b) and the respective regulations issued under those 
sections, it pre-dates the regulations issued under section 704(b) dealing with "revaluations of 
property," which deal with similar issues. 
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basis. However, if Newpartner were precluded from including any partnership 
liabilities in basis, Newpartner would not be permitted to use the deductions 
because they would be suspended under section 704(d) due to the absence of 
outside basis. This result would be unfair and inappropriate for the partners, 
because it would effectively reduce the aggregate deductions currently available 
to the partners. 
c. Capital Accounts and Minimum Gain. Upon purchasing Oldpartner's inter-
est, Newpartner succeeds to Oldpartner's capital account and share of partner-
ship minimum gain. In general, all of the disadvantageous consequences of 
subsequent foreclosure or cancellation of indebtedness income at the partnership 
level would pass through to Newpartner just as it would have to Oldpartner. If, 
however, Newpartner realized ordinary income in the situation of cancellation of 
indebtedness income or capital gain in the situation of foreclosure or deed in lieu 
of foreclosure (absent a section 754 election), Newpartner would have an offset-
ting loss that would arise by virtue of the upward adjustment in outside basis for 
the distributive share of income or gain from the transaction. As such, Newpartner 
would have a resulting capital loss upon liquidation of the partnership, which 
would follow, if not immediately, then eventually. Newpartner may be disad-
vantaged with regard to timing and character, in that Newpartner may have 
ordinary income with only an offsetting long-term capital loss, even though the 
absolute amounts of income and loss would be equivalent.138 
It is important to note, however, that these disadvantageous consequences 
incurred when Newpartner inherits Oldpartner's capital account are unaffected 
by whether Newpartner is entitled to outside basis by virtue of the partnership's 
excess liability. These consequences may be offset, in whole or in part, under 
section 743(b), if applicable, by extra depreciation deductions to which Newpartner 
is entitled by virtue of the special basis or offset to Newpartner's distributive 
share of capital gain. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The potential abuses inherent in excess liability property have been dealt with 
in the Estate of Franklin doctrine and courts that have followed that doctrine. 
Courts have applied the doctrine to the purchase of property. If the doctrine is 
not applicable to a situation at that time, then the nonrecourse debt should be 
regarded as true indebtedness for the duration of the taxpayer's ownership of the 
property. Modification of the nonrecourse liability should not alter this result, 
and Regulation section 1.1001-3 should not be interpreted to cause that to 
happen. 
138 Characterizing items at the partnership level, as discussed above, is similar to other partnership 
level characterizations. For example, if Newpartner were to purchase a partnership interest a day 
before the partnership realizes a long-term capital gain, Newpartner would nevertheless treat the 
distributive share of that capital gain as long-term, even though Newpartner' s own holding period in 
the partnership was short-term. See Rev. Rul. 68-70, I 968- I C. B. 3 I 0. 
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Further, application of the Estate of Franklin doctrine proscribes tax shelter 
abuse. It does not, and indeed should not, however, prescribe punishment by 
imposing a tax on an amount that exceeds a taxpayer's economic income. Both 
the courts and the Treasury have acknowledged this in the past and should 
continue to do so. Analysis of a transaction under the provisions of Subchapter 
K should not change this result. 
Also, ·no transactions among the partners should have the effect of creating an 
extra level of tax that would not have existed in the absence of the interposition 
of a partnership. The statutory provisions, case law, and Treasury regulations 
can all be interpreted to accomplish this intemaiJy consistent result. 
Moreover, even when a statute lends itself to an interpretation that might· 
result in an under-counting of taxable income or over-counting of taxable in-
come,· as measured against economic income, the courts have taken pains to 
explicitly disregard that interpretation to adhere to the basic logic of the income 
tax system and the need for internal consistency of that system. I believe that the · 
courts have chosen' this path wisely, because the clear guiding principle of the 
income tax system, namely to tax economic income, should not be subverted by · 
the imprecision inherent in using ·language to carry out that principle. When 
there has been a potential inconsistency, landmark cases such as Tufts and Phila-
delphia Park have required a statutory interpretation to be consistent with the · 
guiding principle. In a situation when no Court has yet spoken, such as the 
confluence of the Estate of Franklin doctrine with Subchapter K, courts and the 
Service should foiJow the unifying guiding principle of the tax Jaw and interpret · 
more narrowly drafted statutory provisions in a manner that is consistent with 
that principle. Such a course of action is followed when the Estate of Franklin 
doctrine is applied at the partnership rather than the partner level. 
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